University of North Carolina School of Law

Carolina Law Scholarship Repository
AI-DR Collection

AI-DR Program

Spring 6-5-2018

What Should We Do After Work? Automation and Employment
Law
Cynthia L. Estlund

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/aidr_collection
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
PUBLIC LAW & LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER SERIES
WORKING PAPER NO. 17-28
LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER SERIES
WORKING PAPER NO. 17-26

What Should We Do After Work? Automation and
Employment Law

Cynthia Estlund

June 2018

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3007972

What Should We Do After Work?
Automation, Fissuring, and the Law of Work
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Abstract
Will advances in robotics, artificial intelligence, and machine learning
put vast swaths of the labor force out of work or into fierce competition for
the jobs that remain? Or, as in the past, will new jobs absorb workers
displaced by automation? These hotly debated questions have profound
implications for the fortress of rights and benefits that the law of work has
constructed on the foundation of the employment relationship. This Article
charts a path for reforming the law of work in the face of both justified
anxiety and uncertainty about the future impact of automation on jobs.
Automation is driven largely by the same forces that drive firms’
decisions about “fissuring,” or replacing employees with outside contractors.
Fissuring has already transformed the landscape of work and contributed to
weaker labor standards and growing inequality. A sensible response to
automation should have in mind the adjacent problem of fissuring, and vice
versa. Unfortunately, the dominant legal responses to fissuring—which aim
to extend firms’ legal responsibility for the workers whose labor they rely
on—do not meet the distinctive challenge of automation, and even modestly
exacerbate it. Automation offers the ultimate exit from the costs and risks
associated with human labor. As technology becomes an ever-more-capable
and cost-effective substitute for human workers, it enables firms to
circumvent prevailing legal strategies for protecting workers and shoring up
the fortress of employment.
The question is how to protect workers’ rights and entitlements while
reducing firms’ incentive both to replace employees with contractors and to
replace human workers with machines. The answer, I argue, lies in
separating the issue of what workers’ entitlements should be from the issue
of where their economic burdens should fall. Some worker rights and
entitlements necessarily entail employer duties and burdens. But for those
that do not, we should look for ways to shift their costs beyond employer
payrolls, or to extend the entitlements themselves beyond employment. The
existing fortress of employment-based rights and benefits is under assault
from fissuring and automation; it is failing to protect those who remain
outside its walls, and erecting barriers to some who seek to enter. We need
to dismantle some of its fortifications and construct a broader foundation of
economic security for all, including those who cannot or do not make their
living through steady employment.
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Introduction
Three major threats to American jobs have grabbed headlines in recent
years. The first is the migration of manufacturing jobs to China, perhaps
best exemplified by Foxconn, the Taiwanese firm that employs over a
million Chinese workers in the production of iPhones, iPads, and other
consumer electronics. To labor law cognoscenti, the outsourcing of
manufacturing to China, and the feared “race to the bottom” in labor
standards, is mostly yesterday’s news. Since 2015, they have been more
preoccupied with the rise of platform-based “gig” work in place of real jobs,
as epitomized by Uber’s treatment of its drivers as independent contractors
rather than employees.
Yet both of these threats to American jobs and workers arguably pale
beside the threat of automation. If Uber has its way, its drivers will soon go
the way of lamplighters, replaced by self-driving vehicles. 1 And if Foxconn is
representative, Chinese factory jobs are also at risk: by 2016 Foxconn had
replaced 60,000 production workers with robots, and was planning to
replace most of the others within several years.2
For some observers, Uber’s autonomous vehicles and Foxconn’s robots
are harbingers of a jobless future, as machines and algorithms threaten to
put vast swaths of the labor force in the United States and worldwide out of
work or into desperate competition for the jobs that remain. 3 These

1

See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Autonomous Vehicles Could Cost America 5 Million
Jobs. What Should We Do About It?, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2016, 4:00 AM),

http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-greenhouse-driverlessjob-loss-20160922-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/N49P-3ZE8]; Casey
Newton, Uber Will Eventually Replace All Its Drivers with Self-Driving Cars,
VERGE (May 28, 2014, 3:52 PM),

https://www.theverge.com/2014/5/28/5758734/uber-will-eventuallyreplace-all-its-drivers-with-self-driving-cars [https://perma.cc/QN7WCBP9].
Jane Wakefield, Foxconn Replaces ‘60,000 Factory Workers with Robots,’ BBC
NEWS (May 25, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-36376966
[https://perma.cc/XQ3A-6DSG].
3
See Erik Brynjolfsson & Andrew McAfee, Race Against the Machine: How the
Digital Revolution is Accelerating Innovation, Driving Productivity, and Irreversibly
Transforming Employment and the Economy (2012) [hereinafter Race Against the
Machine]; Erik Brynjolfsson & Andrew McAfee, The Second Machine Age: Work,
Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies (2014) [hereinafter The
Second Machine Age]; Martin Ford, Rise of the Robots: Technology and the Threat
of a Jobless Future (2015); Jerry Kaplan, Humans Need Not Apply: A Guide to
2
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commentators describe an exponential growth of technologies that replicate
an ever-wider range of human capabilities.4 Putting aside the more
fantastical predictions about AI dominating or even devouring its human
creators, 5 the prospects for job destruction are eye-opening. Robotic and
digital production of goods and services, coupled with advances in AI and
machine learning, is poised to take over not only the routine or repetitive
tasks that make up many human jobs, but some of the more advanced tasks
as well. On one much-cited reckoning, nearly half of the jobs in the current
economy are at risk. 6 Although some new jobs are readily foreseeable—
especially skilled jobs working with technology—no large new sectors or
industries yet visible on the horizon appear likely to absorb the multitudes of
human workers who might be displaced. Within this camp, predictions
range from a tsunami of job loss to a more manageable rising tide.
For other observers, the real threat from automation is not the net loss
of jobs but the growing polarization of the labor market. 7 These observers
note that automation generates large productivity gains and profits for some,
while destroying many decent mid-level jobs. They predict a growing
economic chasm between those who produce or own the new technology,
or whose high-end skills are complemented by that technology, and most
workers who are stuck competing, and driving down wages, for the jobs that
remain. In this scenario, labor shortages in some skilled job categories will
coexist with labor surpluses and downward wage pressure outside those
categories.

Wealth and Work in the Age of Artificial Intelligence (2015); Andrew Stern & Lee
Kravitz, Raising the Floor: How a Universal Basic Income Can Renew Our
Economy and Rebuild the American Dream (2016).
4
See, e.g., RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE, supra note 3; FORD, supra note 3.
5
For example, there is the “grey goo” scenario, in which self-replicating nano-robots
rapidly consume all organic matter on Earth. See K. ERIC DREXLER, ENGINES OF
CREATION (1986).
6
Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How
Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation? 44 (Oxford Martin Sch., Working Paper,
2013),
https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_
of_Employment.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6F6-ZSMP]). On competing estimates of
automatability, see infra Section II.B.
7
Richard B. Freeman, Who Owns the Robots Rules the World, IZA WORLD LAB. 1, 9
(2015), https://wol.iza.org/uploads/articles/5/pdfs/who-owns-the-robots-rules-theworld.pdf?v=1 [https://perma.cc/V8R9-7PRX]; see also TYLER COWEN, AVERAGE IS
OVER: POWERING AMERICA BEYOND THE AGE OF THE GREAT STAGNATION (2013).
Indeed, economists who do see a new threat from automation tend to predict a
greater impact on wages than on employment. See Freeman, supra, at 4.
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The prospect of large net job losses and sharper income polarization has
generated new interest in the old idea of a universal basic income (UBI), and
a vigorous debate over its merits and plausibility. 8 Other policy proposals
have surfaced as well, including regulation of maximum working hours, 9 and
public investments in job creation and in education and training. But first we
must turn to the other side in the debate over the future impact of
automation on jobs.
The prediction that automation will supplant human labor on a massive
scale must be taken with a large grain of salt, for it has recurred in both
utopian and dystopian flavors throughout the history of industrialization
without yet being realized. 10 Futurists of the past have predicted that mass
automation will usher in an era of human liberation from toil, or that it will
immiserate all but the fortunate few who own or create the machines.11
8

Among proponents, see PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL: WHAT (IF
ANYTHING) CAN JUSTIFY CAPITALISM? 150-53 (1995); STERN & KRAVITZ, supra
note 3; Philippe Van Parijs, Basic Income: A Simple and Powerful Idea for the
Twenty-First Century, in REDESIGNING DISTRIBUTION: BASIC INCOME AND
STAKEHOLDER GRANTS AS CORNERSTONES FOR AN EGALITARIAN CAPITALISM 3, 4
(Erik Olin Wright ed., 2006); and Erik Olin Wright, Basic Income, Stakeholder
Grants, and Class Analysis, 32 POL. & SOC’Y 79 (2004). The idea has been around
for a long time, and has advocates in unlikely places. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962). Indeed, the idea can be traced back to the
sixteenth century and Thomas More’s Utopia. See History of Basic Income, BASIC
INCOME EARTH NETWORK, http://basicincome.org/basic-income/history/
[https://perma.cc/B4TK-CHQK]. The UBI has attracted criticism as well. See, e.g.,
Daniel Sage & Patrick Diamond, Europe’s New Social Reality: The Case Against
Universal Basic Income, POLICY NETWORK (Feb. 16 2017), http://www.policynetwork.net/publications/6190/Europes-New-Social-Reality-the-Case-AgainstUniversal-Basic-Income [https://perma.cc/PKB9-JCRR].
9
See Matthew Dimick, Better Than Basic Income? Liberty, Equality, and the
Regulation of Working Time, 50 IND. L. REV. 473 (2017). Dimick argues that tighter
regulation of working hours is a better solution than the UBI to various problems,
including the prospect of technological unemployment. I address the proposal briefly
below, see infra Section IV.B.
10
See, e.g., John Maynard Keynes, Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren
(1930), reprinted in JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, ESSAYS IN PERSUASION (1963)
(predicting that the standard of life in the U.S. and Europe would improve so
dramatically in one hundred years that people would work only three hours per day).
11
Ryan Avent, Opinion, A World Without Work Is Coming—It Could Be Utopia or It
Could Be Hell, GUARDIAN (Sept. 19, 2016, 01:00 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/19/world-without-workutopia-hell-human-labour-obsolete [https://perma.cc/4XTP-XM4Y]; Ross Douthat,
Opinion, A World Without Work, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/24/opinion/sunday/douthat-a-world-withoutwork.html [https://perma.cc/8ZPA-CXSQ]; Bernard Marr, The 4th Industrial
Revolution and a Jobless Future—A Good Thing?, FORBES (March 3, 2017, 2:05
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/03/03/the-4th-industrial-
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Time and again, however, history has defied such predictions. Automation
has been taking place for centuries, and has been a major driver of growth
and prosperity. The destruction of some jobs has been offset by the creation
of other jobs, usually better-paid and less grueling. 12 The history of
automation’s impact on the labor market has been one of “creative
destruction,” a mantra to which many economists adhere today. For those
who are confident that past trends will continue, the current wave of
automation anxiety amounts to misguided scare-mongering by modern day
Luddites. 13
The debate over automation and jobs rages within and between the
fields of economics and information technology. 14 Among nearly 1900
technology experts who were canvassed in 2014, nearly half said they
believed that “networked, automated, [AI] applications and robotic devices
[will] have displaced more jobs than they have created by 2025.”15 By
contrast, a survey of academic economists also from 2014 found wide
agreement that “advancing automation has not historically reduced
employment in the United States” 16 (which of course sidesteps the claim
that “this time is different”). Yet one-third of them agreed that automation

revolution-and-a-jobless-future-a-good-thing/#476c972f44a5
[https://perma.cc/UT6T-36LV]; Derek Thompson, A World Without Work,
ATLANTIC (July/Aug. 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/07/world-without-work/395294/
[https://perma.cc/M75C-H7U2].
12
David H. Autor, Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of
Workplace Automation, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 10 (2015).
13
See, e.g., Ben Miller & Robert D. Atkinson, Are Robots Taking Our Jobs, or
Making Them?, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 1 (Sept. 2013),
https://www2.itif.org/2013-are-robots-taking-jobs.pdf [https://perma.cc/XP76QWXF].
14
Empirical evidence of the impact of automation on employment to date is scarce,
see Freeman, supra note 7, though one recent study by two leading economists found
that investments in robots are associated with localized net job losses. Daron
Acemoglu & Pascual Restrepo, Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets
(Mar. 17, 2017), https://economics.mit.edu/files/12763 [https://perma.cc/5A9C8FU4]. For some early reactions, see Thomas Claburn, Robots Are Killing Jobs
After All, Apparently: One Droid Equals 5.6 Workers, REGISTER (Mar. 28, 2017,
10:22 PM),
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/03/28/robots_are_killing_jobs_after_all
[https://perma.cc/UNY3-SR9N].
15
Aaron Smith & Janna Anderson, AI, Robotics, and the Future of Jobs, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. 5 (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/08/06/future-ofjobs [http://perma.cc/PG4R-LHYK].
16
Robots, IGM FORUM, CHICAGO BOOTH (Feb. 25, 2014, 1:55 PM),
http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/robots [http://perma.cc/QY4Y-MPUY].
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was “a central reason why median wages have been stagnant in the US over
the past decade, despite rising productivity.”17
The debate over automation also confounds ideological affinities. For
example, economists at the left-leaning Economic Policy Institute reject
both the job-killing story and the income-polarization story about
automation. 18 For them, the very real problem of wage stagnation stems not
from technology but from globalization of trade and finance, declining
union strength, and lagging enforcement of labor standards. By contrast,
labor-friendly Harvard economist Richard Freeman believes that this time
really is different, and that technology has already contributed to a historic
shift in the distribution of income over the past two decades “toward
robots/capital and against labor.” 19 Freeman expects technology to affect
wages more than employment: “The ‘iron law’ of the effect of robots on pay
is that increased substitutability with human skills puts downward pressure
on the wages of persons doing competing tasks–a pressure likely to grow in
the future as technology improves the competence of robots and lowers
their cost.” 20
This vigorous debate is not likely to be resolved within the legal
academy; yet legal scholars, and scholars of labor and employment law in
particular, cannot afford to ignore it. As a society, we have used the
employment relationship as a platform for delivering a plethora of rights,
protections, and benefits that enable people to live a decent life. Net job
losses caused by automation (among other developments) threaten to
destabilize that platform. It is imperative that we try to understand how
automation will affect the future law of work—and how the law of work
affects the future trajectory of automation. My main objective in this Article
is to attempt to frame an optimal strategy for the law of work in the face of
uncertainty about the impact of automation on the labor market.
It is noteworthy that, while those who worry about workers’ well-being
vigorously debate the impact of automation on jobs, they are largely in
17

Id.
Lawrence Mishel & Josh Bivens, The Zombie Robot Argument Lurches On: There
Is No Evidence that Automation Leads to Joblessness or Inequality, ECON. POL’Y
INST. (May 24, 2017), http://www.epi.org/publication/the-zombie-robot-argumentlurches-on-there-is-no-evidence-that-automation-leads-to-joblessness-or-inequality/
[http://perma.cc/MP8X-TMBQ]; see also John Schmitt, Heidi Shierholz & Lawrence
Mishel, Don’t Blame the Robots: Assessing the Job Polarization Explanation of
Growing Wage Inequality (EPI-CEPR, Working Paper Nov. 19, 2013),
http://www.epi.org/publication/technology-inequality-dont-blame-the-robots/
[http://perma.cc/ZUG9-7UWB].
19
Freeman, supra note 7, at 4.
20
Id.
18
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agreement about three other labor market problems: rising income
inequality; eroding labor standards at the low end of the labor market; and
the causal role of “fissuring,” or the growing use of outside contractors
instead of employees, in both trends. If we can find ways to meet the stillcontested challenge of automation that will also address (or at least not
exacerbate) the more certain challenges of fissuring, inequality, and eroding
labor standards, then we will be on solid ground.
To begin, it is important to recognize that many aspects of the law of
work effectively tax the employment of human labor. To that extent it is a
factor both in firms’ flight from direct employment through fissuring and in
their substitution of machines for human workers. In response to fissuring,
many scholars and advocates seek to extend firms’ legal responsibility for
the workers on whose labor they rely, mainly by expanding the definitions of
“employee” and “employer.” But automation offers firms a more complete
exit from the costs, risks, and hassles associated with use of human labor. As
such, extending firms’ legal responsibility for independent contractors or
employees not only fails to meet the challenge of automation, it also
modestly exacerbates that challenge by raising the cost of human labor
versus machines. As technology becomes an increasingly capable and costeffective competitor to human workers, it may doom the prevailing strategy
of shoring up what I call the fortress of employment.
In response to these concerns, this Article explores ways to reduce the
legal tax on employment while protecting the essential rights and
entitlements of all of those who work for a living. The basic move is to
separate the question of what workers’ entitlements should be from the
question of where their economic burdens should fall. Some worker
entitlements (a term I use to encompass rights, protections, and benefits of
various kinds) are inextricable from employer duties; their cost must as a
practical matter, or should as a deterrence matter, be borne by employers.
But for entitlements that are not necessarily linked to employment in these
ways, we should consider ways beyond employment and off of employers’
balance sheets to extend the entitlements, the burden of their funding, or
both. 21 That move would modestly reduce firms’ incentive to replace
employees with contractors and human workers with machines. At the same
time, however, it would extend some basic protections to those left outside
the fortress of employment, and it would open the door for the pursuit of
21

A kindred strategy is sketched near the end of Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights
in the Platform Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 479,
517-18 (2016), as an alternative to privatization of worker benefits. Rogers touts
some of the same virtues of socializing employment-based benefits: promoting
economic equality, reducing employer domination, and expanding access to benefits.
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redistribution through alternative funding mechanisms—a more-thanincidental virtue in our increasingly unequal economy.
I begin in Part I with a closer look at how many jobs are potentially at
risk from automation, how managers make decisions about automation, and
whether and why we should worry about the prospect of net job losses. In
Part II, I explain why the challenge of automation for the future of work
confounds prevailing legal and policy responses to the challenges of
fissuring, declining labor standards, and inequality. Finally, Part III seeks to
chart a path forward in the face of factual uncertainty and multiple
objectives.
I. “This Time is Different”: The Next Wave of Automation and
Why We Should Worry
The history of automation is the history of economic development.
Since the onset of the Industrial Revolution, machines have been replacing
human labor, beginning with production of food and other basic necessities
of life such as textiles and clothing, which occupied the bulk of humanity for
millennia. 22 Machines and the newly collectivized modes of production that
they enabled vastly increased the efficiency of production, drove down the
cost of basic consumer goods, and freed up human labor for new industries
that catered to the evolving appetites of a more prosperous population. 23 In
particular, major technological innovations from the mid-1800s to the mid1900s brought vast improvements in people’s lives and standards of living. 24
Since the mid-twentieth century, automation has continued to destroy some
jobs, to create others, to reduce misery and drudgery on and off the job, and
to generate economic growth and prosperity. 25
So what’s not to like about automation going forward? The answer,
foreshadowed above, lies in the prospect of growing inequality and net job
losses. First, the economic growth and prosperity that labor-replacing
technology has helped to generate, though widely shared during the middle
of the twentieth century, has been sharply skewed toward the top of the

22

See ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE U.S.
STANDARD OF LIVING SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 595 (2016) (“[R]obots [suitable for
business use] are no different in principle from the introduction of machinery dating
back to the textile looms and spindles of the early British industrial revolution. Most
workplace technologies are introduced with the intention of substituting machines
for workers.”).
23
Id. at 62-93.
24
Id. at 94-95.
25
Id. at 566-604.
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income scale since the 1970s. 26 Automation has likely contributed to that
skewed income distribution and will exacerbate it in the future.27 Second,
because emerging technologies are able to replicate or surpass a wider swath
of human capabilities, there is more reason this time around to expect job
destruction to outpace job creation. But debate persists not only over
whether net job destruction is likely, but also over whether that would be
good or bad. Less work might sound like more of a blessing than a curse to
many hard-working people, now and throughout history. This Part will
address both debates, not with an eye to settling them but in order to frame
the analysis that follows.
A. What is New About the New Wave of Automating Technologies?
Those who predict that the impact on jobs of the coming wave of
automation will defy historical patterns point to the distinctive nature of the
emerging technology. Advances in both hard and soft forms of
technology—robots and algorithms, for example—are replicating a much
wider range of human capabilities, and weaving together those distinct
capabilities more seamlessly than ever before. The very terms “artificial
intelligence” (AI) and “machine learning” hint at what is new: technology is
acquiring and refining cognitive and sensory capabilities that had long been
thought to be uniquely human, and is outpacing humans at increasingly
complex tasks.
A few arresting examples underscore the point. Consider the lip-reading
prowess of a program developed by Google and Oxford University using
“deep learning” technology. In 2016, the program far outperformed an
expert human lip-reader, reading four times as many clips without error.28
More familiar is the fact that computers have beat human champions at the
game of Jeopardy!, 29 as well as two notoriously complex board games, chess
(in 1996) 30 and the even more intricate Go (in 2016). 31 The Go saga suggests
26

See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014).
27
See Freeman, supra note 7, at 4-5.
28
A Future That Works: Automation, Employment, and Productivity, MCKINSEY
GLOBAL INST., 34 [hereinafter MGI, A Future That Works],
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Global%20Themes/Digital%20Disru
ption/Harnessing%20automation%20for%20a%20future%20that%20works/MGI-Afuture-that-works-Executive-summary.ashx [https://perma.cc/AB53-DV7V ].
29
John Markoff, Computer Wins on “Jeopardy!”: Trivial, It’s Not, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/science/17jeopardy-watson.html
[https://perma.cc/AB53-DV7V].
30
See Bruce Weber, In Upset, Computer Beats Chess Champion, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
11, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/11/us/in-upset-computer-beats-chesschampion.html [https://perma.cc/28SW-XY72].
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what is revolutionary about AI and machine learning: Google’s AlphaGo
program, which beat the reigning human champion in 2016, worked by
analyzing a vast database of actual human games in Go. Subsequently, a new
program, AlphaGo Zero, learned the game and chose its moves based solely
on the rules and logic of the game itself. Just one year after AlphaGo’s
triumph, “AlphaGo Zero . . . trounced the older program 100 games to
zero, even when it ran on just four processors, compared with the older AI’s
48.” 32
Another example can be found in the field of translation. In July 2016,
Jason Furman, then Chair of the White House Council of Economic
Advisors, used translation as a prime example of humans’ enduring
advantages over computers: “AI today can do decent translations but cannot
come close to what a human can do with his or her knowledge of both
languages, social and cultural context, and sense of the author’s argument,
emotional states, and intentions.” 33 Just four months later, however, Google
launched a new version of Google Translate that exploited recent advances
in machine learning, and brought a quantum leap in quality. 34 Google
Translate suddenly became a much closer rival to human translators—
except that the former is free and instantaneous.
Of course, not many jobs require lip-reading, strategic gaming, or natural
language translation. But given the complex nature of these human skills, the
examples illustrate how far technology has come in recent years and how
fast it is advancing. The examples also suggest the potential for replacing
human labor: once these systems are developed, they can be replicated and
31

See Choe Sang-Hun, Google’s Computer Program Beats Lee Se-dol in Go
Tournament, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/16/world/asia/ korea-alphago-vs-lee-sedolgo.html [https://perma.cc/FMV5-USXK].
32
See Matthew Hutson, This Computer Program Can Beat Humans at Go—With No
Human Instruction, SCIENCE (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/10/computer-program-can-beat-humans-gono-human-instruction [https://perma.cc/LCA9-M36M].
33
Jason Furman, Chairman, Council of Econ. Advisors, Is This Time Different? The
Opportunities and Challenges of Artificial Intelligence, Address at N.Y. Univ. 4
(July 7, 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160707_cea_ai
_furman.pdf [https://perma.cc/VT7V-WQ8X].
34
See Sage Lazzaro, Google Is Using Artificial Intelligence to Make a Huge Change
to Its Translate Tool, N.Y. OBSERVER (Mar. 6, 2017),
https://observer.com/2017/03/google-translate-neural-update/
[https://perma.cc/944Z-QF6U]; Gideon Lewis-Kraus, The Great A.I. Awakening,
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 14, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/magazine/the-great-ai-awakening.html
[https://perma.cc/4KR5-6EZQ].
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deployed innumerable times at little or no marginal cost, while human lipreaders or translators must be paid by the hour.
Thus far, none of our examples involves robots, which spark the
popular imagination but might have a more limited impact on jobs than the
software innovations enabled by machine learning and the capacity to
process vast troves of data. Still, robots are making big inroads in
manufacturing and logistics. Just around the corner are so-called “dark
factories” with so few human workers that “you could switch the lights off
and leave the place to the machines.” 35 It is not only manufacturing jobs
that are at risk from robots. The Kiva robots that automate the “picking and
packing process” at some large Amazon warehouses have sped up Amazon’s
operations while cutting costs by about 20 percent. 36 Meanwhile, their
human coworkers are ambivalent. While walking the aisles was “good
cardio,” said one, the new system lets him get through more orders. 37 “We
don’t socialize as much,” he said, “but it’s more efficient.” 38
The point can be generalized. Like the Kiva robots, technology both
replaces human labor in some tasks and complements human labor, or
makes it more productive, in other tasks. 39 The latter function is part of how
automation can create jobs. Both sides of the equation have drawn empirical
scrutiny and generated debate, as discussed the next two Sections.
B. Estimating Automatability and the Pace of Automation of Existing Jobs
A recent spate of studies seeks to measure the extent of “automatability”
of existing jobs. 40 Estimates vary from less than ten percent to nearly half of
35

Will Knight, China Is Building a Robot Army of Model Workers, MIT TECH. REV.
(Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601215/china-is-building-arobot-army-of-model-workers/ [https://perma.cc/8EQV-LNN7].
36
10 Most Amazing Robots in the World, VENTURE PACT (Nov. 11, 2016),
https://blog.venturepact.com/10-most-amazing-robots-in-the-world/. The Kiva robot
is about 16 inches tall, weighing around 320 pounds, square-shaped, yellow machine
that runs on wheels. They can run at a steady 5 mph and haul packages weighing up
to 700 pounds. Kiva robots pick up shelves of products from the warehouse floor and
bring them to a human employee who picks items and then packs them for shipping.
While navigating, they avoid running into each other by using sensors that talk to
one another. Id.
37
Donna Tam, Meet Amazon’s Busiest Employee—The Kiva Robot, CNET (Nov. 30,
2014), https://www.cnet.com/news/meet-amazons-busiest-employee-the-kiva-robot/
[https://perma.cc/FSY7-N9NB].
38
Id.
39
For an attempt to model both dimensions of automation, see Daron Acemoglu &
Pascual Restrepo, Artificial Intelligence, Automation and Work (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24196, 2018).
40
Compare, e.g., Frey & Osborne, supra note 6, at 44 (estimating that nearly half of
all jobs are at “high risk” of automation) with Melanie Arntz et al., The Risk of
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the jobs in the United States. 41 A 2017 report by a team of researchers at the
McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) analyzed what current technology can do
and what humans are currently paid to do, both at a fairly granular level, to
determine how much human work in today’s economy is capable of being
automated. The team looked at several major economies, but the focus here
is on the U.S. results. The MGI study captures both the dramatic potential
for job loss and the uncertainty of its time frame and extent. 42
On the capabilities of current technology, the MGI researchers
identified eighteen distinct human capabilities in five broad categories—
sensory perception, cognitive skills, natural language processing, social and
emotional skills, and physical skills—and assessed how current technology
stacks up against human performance on these dimensions. 43 Not
surprisingly, humans beat technology at sensing others’ emotional state and
responding in emotionally appropriate ways (although technology is making
progress). 44 On the other hand, technology already outperforms most
humans in many physical and cognitive skills. 45 On some tasks like data
processing, computers leave even the most skilled human being in the dust.
While it is clear that machines have gained ground on humans across a
wide range of skills and capabilities, how much actual human work can be
automated? The MGI researchers broke down human work activities into
seven large categories and analyzed what percentage of the time humans
spend on each of those activities is capable of being automated “by adapting
currently demonstrated technology.” 46 Least automatable are management
and development of people (9%); application of expertise to decision
making, planning, and creative tasks (18%); interacting with stakeholders like
customers, suppliers, or the public (20%); and unpredictable physical
Automation for Jobs in OECD Countries: A Comparative Analysis 4 (OECD Soc.,
Emp’t & Migration Working Papers No. 189, 2016), https://www.oecdilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/the-risk-of-automation-for-jobs-in-oecdcountries_5jlz9h56dvq7-en [https://perma.cc/ZJU7-UGUD] (estimating that nine
percent of jobs in the OECD are at risk).
41
See supra note 40 and accompanying text. The OECD study above criticizes Frey
& Osborne, supra note 6, for overestimating automatability by failing to
disaggregate occupations; but it appears to underestimate automatability by focusing
on fully automatable jobs, and discounting firms’ ability (over time) to consolidate
non-automatable tasks into a smaller number of human jobs.
42
MGI, A Future That Works, supra note 28, at vi.
43
Id. at 35 exhibit 3.
44
Id. at 29, 35 exhibit 3, 72.
45
Id. at 1, 3, 10, 23-24 exhibit 1, 26, 35 exhibit 3. The researchers conclude that
machines can match or surpass several human capabilities, including “information
retrieval, gross motor skills, and optimization.” Id. at 10.
46
Id. at 42 & exhibit 8.
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activities (26%). Much more automatable are collection of data (64%);
processing of data (69%); and predictable physical activities (81%).47
Because the mix of workers’ activities varies widely by sector and by
occupation, so does automatability. The MGI researchers estimate that, at
one end of the spectrum, work in the accommodation and food services
sector is 73% automatable; that is, 73% of the time for which humans are
now paid in that sector is spent in activities that could be automated with
existing technology. By comparison, work in the health care and social
assistance sector is just 36% automatable. (Readers employed in
“educational services” will be happy to learn that it is the least automatable
large sector at 27%.) 48 At the finer level of occupations, the work of both
sewing machine operators and graders of agricultural products is nearly
100% automatable, while that of psychiatrists is between 0 and 10%
automatable. 49 It is not just professional jobs that are relatively insulated
from automation. Some low-wage jobs are hard to automate because they
involve unpredictable physical tasks (janitors, landscape workers, and
domestic workers, for example) or social and emotional skills (child care or
elder care, for example); but pay remains low because those basic skills are
far from scarce in the labor force.
Putting these data sets together, the MGI researchers estimate that 46%
of all of the time for which people are now paid in the U.S. economy is spent in activities
that could be automated based on currently available technology. 50 And that estimate is
based only on “currently demonstrated technology.” It is mainly the
prospect of future innovations—including technology that exists today but
has not yet been adapted to perform work in today’s economy—that leads
some in or near the tech sector to predict massive job losses. 51
Those who are focused on the technology itself, however, may tend to
overestimate the speed or extent of job destruction. Technical automatability
is only the threshold factor in firms’ decisions about automation. For one, it
is no easy matter to disaggregate automatable tasks from those that humans
still do better. As David Autor writes, “many of the tasks currently bundled
into . . . jobs cannot readily be unbundled . . . without a substantial drop in
47

Id. Not all activities within a category are equally automatable. For example, the
predictable physical activities involved in “accommodation and food services” are
over 90 percent automatable, while those involved in “health care and social
assistance” are only 50 to 60 percent automatable. Id. at 44 exhibit 9.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 5 exhibit E2, 106.
50
Id. at 32.
51
See supra note 40 and accompanying text (cataloging differing job loss estimates,
one estimating that half of all jobs will be lost due to automation).
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quality.” 52 In any case, it will take time and managerial skill to reconfigure
jobs and organizations. It will also require some highly skilled workers to
implement and work with the new technology; and those workers will be in
high demand. 53 Given these challenges and uncertainties, the MGI study is
circumspect about how long it is likely to take to move from technical
automatability to large-scale automation, with estimates ranging from two to
six decades. The process is likely to be faster for software innovations
(which are easier and cheaper to implement) than for robots, faster for
higher-wage but automatable jobs, and faster in higher-wage countries like
the United States. 54
The MGI study identifies one large and pervasive factor in managers’
decisions about automation: labor costs. If an existing technology—a robot
or a software solution—is capable of performing certain tasks for which a
firm currently employs humans, then the firm must weigh the costs of
acquiring, operating, and maintaining the technology, and of reorganizing
operations accordingly, against the potential gains. 55 Chief among those
gains is labor cost savings: How many hours of human labor could be saved,
and what are the direct and indirect costs associated with that labor? Other
less-quantifiable gains in safety, reliability, and quality, for example, may be
even greater in some cases. But labor costs are obviously crucial, and will
inevitably affect the pace of automation. As a result, the most automatable
jobs may not be the first to disappear. For example, while jobs in
“accommodations and food services” are among the most automatable in
the U.S. economy (73%), low wages in that sector tend to slow the process
of automation. 56 I will return below to the link between labor costs and
automation decisions.
The MGI report concludes that automation is currently proceeding too
slowly to garner all of the gains that it could generate. 57 Firms are failing to
capture the efficiency gains that are already possible with existing
technology, and that are necessary, especially in aging societies, to increase
52

Autor, supra note 12, at 27.
MGI, A Future That Works, supra note 28, at 114-15.
54
Id. at 10, 12, 40, 53, 76-77, 80, 83, 95-96.
55
Id. at 67-70.
56
Id. at 7 exhibit E4, 68.
57
Id. at 109-116; see also Furman, supra note 33, at 4 (“We have had substantial
innovation in robotics, AI, and other areas in the last decade. But we will need a
much faster pace of innovation in these areas to really move the dial on productivity
growth going forward.”); Matthew Yglesias, The Automation Myth, VOX (July 27,
2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.vox.com/2015/7/27/9038829/automation-myth
[http://perma.cc/Y7R6-BWTR] (arguing the pace of automation must accelerate to
meet society’s basic needs).
53
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productivity and drive economic growth. But even if faster automation can
generate greater gains, it might also generate greater losses in the form of
displaced workers. That depends on the other side of the equation—new
job creation—and that is where debate about automation and jobs is least
empirically grounded.
C. New Job Creation: Labor Complementarity, Consumer Surplus, and New
Kinds of Jobs (But How Many?)
Like many economists, the MGI researchers tend toward optimism
about the economic impact of technology, including their faith that
historical patterns of creative destruction through innovation will continue.
Their prediction that automation would spur economic growth in the United
States and across the globe 58 was based on an explicit assumption that
“human labor displaced by automation would rejoin the workforce and be as
productive as it was in 2014, that is, new demand for labor will be
created.” 59 That looks like a colossal leap of faith when compared with the
meticulous and sophisticated analysis behind the estimates of likely job
losses.
A more recent MGI report does seek to identify sources of new or
increased demand for labor that might absorb workers displaced by
automation, and to quantify new job creation. 60 That study parallels efforts
by leading economists to model the impact of automation on both job
destruction and job creation and to come to grips analytically with the
contingencies affecting the economy’s absorption of displaced workers into
new jobs. 61 As Daron Acemoglu and Pascual Restrepo emphasize in a recent
paper, contrary to “accounts emphasizing that technology always increases
the demand for labor and benefits workers,” some technological innovations
might “simultaneously reduce wages and employment.” 62 Economists—
both modelers and measurers—are thus interrogating the historically
grounded conventional wisdom on creative destruction.

58

MGI, A Future That Works, supra note 28, at 87-101.
Id. at 90. Indeed, it is “vital that there be new demand for labor displaced by
automation.” Id.
60
McKinsey Global Institute, Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained: Workforce Transitions in a
Time of Automation, MCKINSEY & CO. (Dec. 2017),
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Global%20Themes/Future%20of%2
0Organizations/What%20the%20future%20of%20work%20will%20mean%20for%2
0jobs%20skills%20and%20wages/MGI-Jobs-Lost-Jobs-Gained-Report-December-62017.ashx [https://perma.cc/F8TR-HEJS] [hereinafter MGI, Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained].
61
Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 39.
62
Id. at 11, 6.
59
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Automation can help to create new jobs in a few different ways. First,
there will be new jobs for those who create, implement, maintain, and work
with the new technology itself. 63 Second, the productivity gains and cost
savings stemming from automation can increase consumer incomes, which
in turn can generate new demand for human labor both in existing job
categories and in new jobs producing goods and services that do not exist in
the current economy. 64 Economists have estimated that by 2030, “9 percent
of the US labor force could be employed in occupations that do not exist
today.” 65 Not surprisingly, efforts to quantify predictions of job creation are
much hazier than the estimates of job losses, which turn on observable
features of existing jobs and existing technology.
Haziness also stems from future contingencies affecting job creation. In
particular, MGI’s sanguine prognoses of economic growth and job creation
depend on firms and governments making major investments in training and
education, human services, infrastructure, and income support. 66 The MGI
researchers’ bottom-line prediction for the United States is that job creation
will just about keep pace with job destruction in the coming decades, but
only if all of those stimulating and mitigating measures are indeed
forthcoming—that is, only if their so-called “step-up scenario” takes place.67
Yet even the step-up scenario will not be enough, they predict, if job
destruction through automation is at the faster end of the MGI’s own
estimated ranges.68
Even apart from those two big explicit “ifs,” the MGI estimates seem to
depend on some worrisome circularities. The lion’s share of new jobs is
supposed to stem from higher consumer incomes and the resulting increase
in demand for goods and services that more productive machines will help

63

MGI, Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained, supra note 60, at 7 (estimating that 20 to 50 million
jobs related to developing and deploying new technology could be created by 2030);
Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 39, at 10 (describing new jobs that could be
created to maintain and deploy new AI technologies in health care, design, and
education).
64
Regarding other possible sources of new jobs, see Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra
note 39, at 10 (discussing the possibility that “rapid automation may endogenously
generate incentives for firms to introduce new labor-intensive tasks”).
65
MGI, Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained, supra note 60, at 70.
66
For certain trends, the report does model both a “trendline scenario,” in which
current trends continue, and a “step-up scenario,” in which both governments and
firms take a variety of active measures to assist in absorbing and redeploying
workers in new, needed services and projects. Id. at 6-8.
67
Id. at 14 (finding that “[e]nough jobs are created in the step-up scenario . . . to
offset both automation and the growth in labor force”).
68
Id.
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to generate. 69 But what if income growth is sharply skewed toward the rich
and especially toward owners of capital rather than being widely distributed
through new decently paid jobs? 70 Such a distribution would affect job
growth because richer people spend proportionally less of their income to
consume goods and services. 71 And what if the new goods and services that
people want could themselves be produced largely by robots or algorithms?
These two hypotheticals offer two reasons to doubt whether increased
consumer income will be the engine of job creation that it has been in the
past. 72
If predictions of new job creation prove too optimistic for any of the
reasons suggested above, or if job destruction outpaces current estimates,
then many workers displaced from mid-level jobs over the next few decades
may find themselves competing for jobs that are hard to automate but
require no special human skills or that are not worth automating because
wages are so low.
All sides in the debate over automation’s impact on jobs are on the
lookout for evidence in today’s economy to support their position. Those
who are skeptical that automation is having a major effect on jobs point out
that no impact is yet reflected in some key statistics.73 Unemployment has
fallen to historic lows, and employers in parts of the country are
encountering labor shortages. 74 Those skeptics also point to sluggish
productivity growth in recent years. Stated simply: “If automation were
rapidly accelerating, labor productivity and capital investment would also be
surging as fewer workers and more technology did the work. But labor

69

Id. at 6.
See Freeman, supra note 7.
71
See Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 39, at 33 (predicting that new job creation
would be slowed down and both displacement and inequality exacerbated if “the rise
in real incomes resulting from automation ends up in the hands of an narrow segment
of the population with much lower marginal propensity to consume than those losing
incomes and their jobs”); see also Josh Zumbrun, How Rich and Poor Spend (and
Earn) Their Money, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2015, 12:38 PM),
https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/04/06/how-the-rich-and-poor-spend-and-earntheir-money/ [http://perma.cc/EE8Y-PE38].
72
Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 39, at 6.
73
See Furman, supra note 33 (arguing “that the economic impact of AI will [not] be
very different from previous technological advances”); Autor, supra note 12, at 5-9.
74
Binyamin Appelbaum, Lack of Workers, Not Work, Weighs on the Nation’s
Economy, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/21/us/politics/utah-economy-jobs.html
[https://perma.cc/2T8X-FK7S].
70
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productivity and capital investment have actually decelerated in the 2000s.”75
The coexistence of stagnant productivity growth and highly visible advances
in automation technology is puzzling to many observers. 76 It could be that
workers are being diverted into less productive jobs in the protean but zerosum quest for market share, as Tyler Cowen has suggested. 77 Or it could just
be that the future impact of automation is still in the future (which is
notoriously hard to predict). 78
On the other hand, harbingers of future job losses might be seen in two
well-documented trends. The first is the long-term decline in labor force
participation—for young and old men, 79 and, since the 1950s, for prime
working-age men. 80 (Women’s workforce participation has obviously

75

The Editorial Board, No, Robots Aren’t Killing the American Dream, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/opinion/no-robots-arentkilling-the-american-dream.html [https://perma.cc/J36Y-ZGWN]. The editorial cites
data and economists from the Economic Policy Institute. See also MISHEL & BIVENS
supra note 18, at 10.
76
As Larry Summers put it, “Any fully-satisfactory [sic] synthetic view has to
reconcile those two observations. I have not heard them satisfactorily reconciled.
This is something we have to figure out.” Larry Summers, Former Dir., Nat’l Econ.
Council, Remarks at the Brookings Institute’s “Future of Work” Panel (Feb. 19,
2015) (partial transcript available at https://larrysummers.com/2015/02/23/thefuture-of-jobs [https://perma.cc/JN97-QS43]).
77
Cowen points to the proliferation of jobs in branding and marketing: “[M]achines
are not effective at persuading, at developing advertising campaigns, at branding
products or corporations, or at greeting you at the door in a charming manner. . . .
Those activities will remain the province of human beings for a long time to come.”
Tyler Cowen, In a Robot Economy, All Humans Will Be Marketers, BLOOMBERG
VIEW (July 26, 2017, 1:16 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-0726/in-a-robot-economy-all-humans-will-be-marketers [https://perma.cc/Q9G5KPJV]. Those activities do not show up in productivity statistics because they do not
produce anything; they are mostly part of a “zero- or negative-sum game” in which
“[e]ach business tries to pull customers away from the other brands.” Id. The
question is whether those jobs can sustain a healthy economy over the longer run. Id.
78
According to Yogi Berra, Niels Bohr, and an ancient Danish proverb. It’s Difficult
to Make Predictions, Especially About the Future, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (Oct. 20,
2013), https://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/10/20/no-predict/ [https://perma.cc/B437B7MS].
79
See GORDON, supra note 22, at 250-53.
80
The Long-Term Decline in Prime-Age Male Labor Force Participation, WHITE
HOUSE COUNCIL ECON. ADVISERS 7 (June 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160620_cea_p
primeag_male_lfp.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZ76-5E95] [hereinafter Long-Term
Decline]; see also Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor,
The Employment Situation—May 2017,
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_06022017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T7Y3-8XPJ].
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increased over that period, though it has fallen since 2000. 81) Nationwide,
twelve percent of men ages twenty-five to fifty-four, and seventeen percent
of those with only a high school degree or less, were out of the labor force
in 2016; that compares to two percent and three percent, respectively, in
1954. 82 The second trend is a long-term decline in working hours per
employee across all sectors—on one recent accounting, from nearly sixty
hours per week in the 1890s to just over twenty-five hours per week in
2010. 83 In short, automation has a long history of enabling the production
of more goods and services with fewer total hours of human labor. Those
who now predict significant net job losses due to automation posit a
continuation and acceleration of those trends.
D. Should We Worry About or Welcome a Future with Much Less Work?
If the coming wave of automation does enable greater economic output
with less need for human labor, why not celebrate? Most humans
throughout modern history have aspired to a life with more leisure and less
toil. The demise of child labor, the advent of the forty-hour work week, and
the rise of retirement are among the greatest joint achievements of
organized labor and modern industrial capitalism, with automation playing a
starring role.
The prospect of large net job losses from automation has its enthusiastic
proponents, especially on the left, as it has in the past. 84 There is little doubt
that one can imagine a world with much less paid work that many people
would happily embrace. Imagine, for example, a world in which everyone
can meet all of their basic economic needs while working thirty hours per
week and forty weeks per year, or fewer. That world would probably include
a universal basic income, access to educational opportunities throughout
81

See Sandra E. Black, Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach & Audrey Breitwieser, The
Recent Decline in Women’s Labor Force Participation, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct.
2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/es_10192017_decline_womens_labor_force_participation_
blackschanzenbach.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YTT-8M38].
82
Long-Term Decline, supra note 80, at 2.
83
GORDON, supra note 22, at 259. That is across all sectors, including agriculture.
The decline before World War II reflects mainly the reduced work week and the
advent of vacations; after World War II it reflects partly the entry of women into the
workforce and the rise of part-time jobs. Id. at 259-60.
84
See, e.g., André Gorz, Farewell to the Working Class: An Essay on Post-Industrial
Socialism (1982); Kathi Weeks, The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism,
Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries (2011); Nick Srineck & Alex Williams,
Postcapitalism and a World Without Work (2015). These writers have predecessors
among nineteenth-century social thinkers. See, e.g., Edward Bellamy, Looking
Backward: 2000-1887 (1887); John Adolphus Etzler, The Paradise Within the Reach
of All Men, Without Labour, by Powers of Nature and Machinery (1833).
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one’s life, and ample public goods of all kinds. It would be a far more
egalitarian and less market-centric world than we have now. Indeed, it might
require a radical transformation, or even the end, of capitalism as we know
it. 85 If that is one’s ideal vision of the future, then one might look for ways
to accelerate the replacement of human labor with technology while
agitating for the radical social and political changes that would be required to
bring about this more egalitarian distribution of income, work, and leisure. 86
But others who would welcome a world of less work might still fear
large-scale net job destruction in the near or medium term. They might share
with the utopian proponents of faster automation an ideal vision of the
future, but diverge in what they believe is possible or likely given our current
politics and social arrangements. Given those existing arrangements, a large
decline in the demand for human labor threatens to leave many people not
with fewer hours of work (and decent pay) but with no regular paid work at
all and too little income to live a decent life. If that is what a future of less
work looks like, then it would be perverse to characterize it as one of greater
leisure. Leisure without an adequate source of household income is just the
poverty and malaise of long-term unemployment.
The economic consequences of rising unemployment—periodic and
long-term—only begin with the loss of wages. More than its European
counterparts, the American social model delivers many of the material
requisites of a decent life—not only income, but also retirement security and
insurance for health care, disability, and unemployment—mainly through
employment. 87 The employment relationship is also the primary locus of
most protections against discrimination, retaliation against protected
activities, unsafe working conditions, and excessive work hours. Outside the
highly regulated employment nexus, and above a rather stingy safety net for
the poor, individuals are largely left to the tender mercies of the market,
armed with whatever individual bargaining power they can muster given the
85

See Randall Collins, The End of Middle-Class Work: No More Escapes, in
IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN ET AL., DOES CAPITALISM HAVE A FUTURE? (2013).
86
See, e.g., SRNICEK & WILLIAMS, supra note 84 (calling for significant wage
increases as a way to accelerate automation and destruction of jobs while increasing
the returns to labor).
87
See David Charny, The Employee Welfare State in Transition, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1601, 1601 (1996) (“[T]he United States has relied substantially less than other
industrialized countries on social welfare schemes financed and administered by the
state or by quasi-public entities other than employers.”); Katherine V.W. Stone, A
Fatal Mismatch: Employer-Centric Benefits in a Boundaryless World, 11 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 451 (2007) (arguing the employer-centered model of social insurance
and welfare benefits has largely outlived its usefulness in the new “boundaryless”
workplace).
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intersection of their skill set with changing market conditions. Automation
threatens the future reach not only of the so-called “standard employment
relationship”—the long-term, full-time jobs that were the foundation of
American prosperity, partial though it was—but of paid work generally.
The problem with a significant loss of paid work—if that is what we are
facing—is not only an economic one. Useful work is central not only to
most people’s identity, but to our collective social and political life. The
experience of shared work fosters social interaction and social integration,
solidarity and friendship, and cooperation and compromise amidst conflict.
Work and workplace relationships are a far more prolific source of
communal, cooperative, and collegial ties than neighborhoods or other
associations; and those ties play a crucial role in maintaining the social fabric
of a diverse society. 88 That social fabric will become even more frayed, and
our politics even more fraught, if a growing segment of the population finds
itself detached from the world of work. I think that would be true even if
people’s basic material needs were met by something like a universal basic
income.
To be sure, people like me (and probably most of my readers) who have
or aspire to fulfilling and high-status jobs may be inclined to idealize work as
a source of community and identity. Labor lawyers and scholars in particular
tend to romanticize the experience of shared work and solidarity among coworkers. Looking ahead, we might need to recalibrate our cultural matrix of
values away from what one does for a living and toward what one does with
one’s life, and to reconfigure our institutions to enable people to alternate
among periods of education, caring for family, recreation, civic and
volunteer work, and paid work. 89
All in all, if we could ensure a reasonably fair distribution of income,
leisure, and work, 90 then the growing ability to replace human labor with
machines and technology would have a very different valence. (Indeed, the
argument developed here aims in that direction.) In the meantime, however,
ours is a society in which most people’s income and economic security, as
well as their identity, status, and experience of collective effort toward
shared aims, are all heavily dependent on paid work. That makes the
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See generally CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE
BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003) (arguing that the hotbed of
sociability and cooperation among diverse co-workers makes workplace ties crucial
in a diverse democratic society).
89
See WEEKS, supra note 84 (challenging the centrality of work to identify, morality,
and social organization).
90
As in Thomas More’s original Utopia, as it happens. Cf. supra note 8.
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prospect of significant net job destruction through automation deeply
unsettling even if it is still highly uncertain.
In between the lines of the comparatively optimistic MGI Report, one
can discern the possibility of a feverishly competitive future—a high-stakes
tournament in which firms with the talent, agility, and perhaps ruthlessness
to exploit labor-saving technology will be among the winners, as will
individuals who learn to “race with the machines.” 91 It is in the nature of
tournaments that losers outnumber winners, and this tournament will be
true to form. Firms in competitive markets will lose out if they continue to
employ people to do things that machines can do more efficiently, and if
they lack the human talent and organizational agility to constantly adapt to
and adopt new technology. As a result, and far more importantly, people will
lose out if they fail to acquire the high-end and hard-to-automate skills that
will be in greatest demand, if they lack the resources and opportunities
needed to acquire those skills, or if they crumple under the pressure of the
tournament itself. There will be many fewer of the decent mid-level jobs that
require diligent completion of mostly routine tasks, and that have sustained
the broad middle of the working population for centuries.
One cannot help but blanch at how much will be demanded of the
human beings who hope to come out on top of this tournament. They will
need to be highly intelligent, adaptable, and entrepreneurial about their
working lives, and able continually to retrain and redeploy their talents to
meet the ever-changing demands of technological innovation and dynamic
market conditions. That in turn will require a high level of psychological
resilience and tolerance for risk and change (as well as a strong basic
education that equips them to learn how to learn). Not everyone is blessed
by nature and nurture with the makings of those traits, and not everyone in
our egregiously unequal society has an opportunity to cultivate those traits.
Moreover, there is little room in this scenario for a balanced life, one that is
not dominated by the competition to get and stay ahead in an increasingly
polarized labor market.
Perhaps paradoxically, many of those who can still find work in the
more polarized economy that rapid automation might produce—both at the
top and the bottom of the labor market—might find themselves working
91

MGI, Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained, supra note 60, at 125-27. Eric Brynjolffsson
maintains that humans should “race with the machines” rather than against them.
Eric Brynjolffsson & Andrew McAfee, Race Against the Machine: How the Digital
Revolution is Accelerating Innovation, Driving Productivity, and Irreversibly
Transforming Employment and the Economy, MIT CTR. FOR DIG. BUS. (Jan. 2012),
http://ebusiness.mit.edu/research/Briefs/Brynjolfsson_McAfee_Race_Against_the_
Machine.pdf [https://perma.cc/5T95-LDSF].
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very long hours, albeit for diametrically opposed reasons. Those with rare
skills their employers might rationally converge around long hours of work
(as we already see now). By contrast, some workers who lack rare skills will
scramble to work longer hours or multiple jobs at low wages just to make
ends meet.
E. Alternative Futures and Why the Pace of Automation Matters
Let me sum up the foregoing account with five possible (albeit not
exhaustive) futures for workers in light of the new automation’s effect on
jobs: 92
First, there is a dystopian vision of immiseration at the bottom—
growing unemployment, or at least desperate wage-suppressing competition
for the jobs that machines can’t do as well or as cheaply, but that most
humans can do—and a growing concentration of wealth at the top, among
those who make or own the technology and those whose scarce skills are
augmented by technology. Let us posit that this is a future that is worth
striving to avoid. 93
Second, there is the rather complacent view that probably still
predominates among economists: trust in creative destruction and
capitalism. History suggests that job destruction through automation,
though temporarily disruptive, is likely to be offset by creation of new and
better jobs that satisfy evolving, and bottomless, consumer appetites. 94 I
would contend that, if the first dystopian vision is a plausible future, then
the second vision is too complacent—even if it is also plausible. 95
Third, there is the vision of the MGI’s “stepped-up scenario.” If firms
and governments rise to the challenge of automation by investing heavily in
infrastructure, training and education, income support, and social services,
then job creation can keep pace with job destruction, and we can enjoy
continuing growth and prosperity. Many on the left will find this
supercharged version of capitalism unappealing (albeit preferable to the first
92

My terminology here echoes that of Peter Frase in Four Futures: Life After
Capitalism. But his futures are more starkly futuristic and (deliberately) less tethered
to realism than those sketched here.
93
See PETER FRASE, FOUR FUTURES: LIFE AFTER CAPITALISM (2016) (offering a
speculative portrait of what this future might entail).
94
See TL Andrews, Robots Won’t Take Your Job—They’ll Help Make Room for
Meaningful Work Instead, QUARTZ MAG., Mar. 15, 2017; Autor, supra note 12;
GORDON, supra note 22.
95
Even the MGI, in its “trendline scenario,” finds that net job losses are likely to
mount without a range of institutional responses to stimulate job growth, promote
redeployment of workers, and cushion losses. See MGI, Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained,
supra note 60, at 14.
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dystopian vision) for reasons sketched above. 96 But it would in any case
require a suite of ambitious public policy measures and expenditures to keep
job losses from outstripping job creation; and even those will be inadequate
if automation proceeds faster than expected.
Fourth, there is the utopian (and perhaps post-capitalist) vision of the
future in which automation enables everyone to live a decent life with little
or no paid work, and with a beneficent state overseeing a fair distribution of
work, leisure, and income. Many readers will dismiss this vision as hopelessly
unrealistic; others will recoil from the vision of a society without paid work.
But even those who find this vision both attractive and within the realm of
possibility should concede that it would require a radical transformation of
politics and social institutions, and a raft of ameliorative policy measures to
fend off the dystopian scenario. The challenge will be much greater if
automation proceeds faster than expected.
Finally, there is a fifth possible future with significantly less paid work
but a fairer distribution of work, income, and leisure. That scenario would
require a gradual shift toward shorter workweeks, with provision for
periodic paid leaves from work, decent incomes, and universal basic social
entitlements. 97 Here, too, the faster automation and destruction of existing
jobs proceed, the harder it would be to construct this more egalitarian and
human future.
96

See supra Section II.D.
This future would build on basic features of social policy in most European
countries, which are grounded in a belief that it is necessary to “constrain the free
market in the name of the public interest” in order to stave off war and lay the
foundation of a just society. TONY JUDT, ILL FARES THE LAND 75 (2010); see also
PETER BALDWIN, THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY: CLASS BASES OF THE
EUROPEAN WELFARE STATE 1875-1975 (1990) (examining the social bases of the
European welfare state); GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN: THE THREE WORLDS OF
WELFARE CAPITALISM (1990) (distinguishing three major types of welfare state in
advanced Western countries); TONY JUDT, POSTWAR: A HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE
1945 (2005). Some contemporary political actors and intellectuals in the United
States are currently drawing on the ideals of European Social Democracy for both
moral inspiration and concrete policy ideas in their effort to construct a humane
political economy and respond to challenges such as automation. See, e.g., LESSONS
FROM EUROPE?: WHAT AMERICANS CAN LEARN FROM EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICIES
(R. Daniel Kelemen ed., 2015); LANE KENWORTHY, SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AMERICA
(2015); STEPHEN HILL, EUROPE’S PROMISE: WHY THE EUROPEAN WAY IS THE BEST
HOPE IN AN INSECURE AGE (2010). European Social Democracy faces its own
challenges, however, on political, ideological, and economic fronts. For a wideranging assessment of these challenges, see THE CRISIS OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN
EUROPE (Michael Keating & David McCrone eds., 2013). The comparative
perspective on the challenge of automation to the future of work is largely beyond
the scope of this Article, but I plan to take it up in future work.
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This last vision of the future might appeal to many readers, as it does to
me. Others will disagree as to what is desirable and what is achievable.
(Indeed, one dimension of an attractive future, in my view, is the room it
makes for divergent choices about the mix of, and tradeoffs among, labor,
leisure, and income.) It seems clear, however, that avoiding dystopia and
reaching one of the better futures (better, that is, for the bottom eighty or
ninety percent of the population) would require major changes both in
policies and in the state of our politics. That process, too, will take time, and
could careen off the rails—if it hasn’t already done so—if job losses and
economic misery and resentments start to mount. It is imperative that
citizens and political leaders begin to focus on these alternative scenarios,
and avoid simply falling by default into the dystopian future (or by
complacently trusting in creative destruction, which could lead to the same
result if economists turn out to be wrong).
For all these reasons, and across a wide range of views about the
likelihood and the desirability of a society with much less work, the pace of
automation-based job destruction is a critical factor. Public policy and public
spending will have to play a large role in fostering new job creation and in
equipping workers for those new jobs. But the faster jobs are destroyed, the
harder it will be for job creation and worker retraining to keep pace. Faster
job destruction will yield more wrenching social consequences and more
inhospitable conditions for a serious and sober political debate about
spreading the gains and cushioning the losses from automation.
Many bodies of law are relevant to the pace of automation. 98 My aim
here is to understand how labor and employment law might affect the pace
of automation-related job losses, and how that body of law might best
respond to the challenge of automation. To that end, it is important first to
situate automation among other changes in the organization of work that
have lately preoccupied labor scholars, policy makers, and advocates. That is
because the prevailing prescriptions for responding to those changes within
labor and employment law might counterproductively speed up automationrelated job losses.
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For example, very recent work has explored the impact of the law governing
intellectual property and innovation, see Camilla A. Hrdy, Technological
Un/Employment (Feb. 20, 2018) (unpublished paper),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3011735
[https://perma.cc/JG8V-5N77], and tax law, see Ryan Abbott & Bret
Bogenschneider, Should Robots Pay Taxes? Tax Policy in the Age of Automation, 12
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2018),
http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/821099/1/Should%20Robots%20Pay%20Taxes.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TH4G-N4PD].
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II. How Automation Alters the Landscape of Work and Confounds
Efforts to Shore Up the Fortress of Employment
The challenge that automation poses to the future of work is in many
ways continuous with the more familiar and less uncertain challenges of
“fissuring”—the growing proclivity of firms to outsource, offshore, or
otherwise contract out their labor needs to other firms and individuals. In
particular, the managerial decisions behind both fissuring and automation
reflect similar causal forces, including the manifold costs associated with
direct employment of human labor. But automation is also different in very
basic ways that confound prevailing strategies for coping with the challenge
of fissuring.
A. Fissuring, and the Growth of Outsourcing, Off-shoring, and Platform-based
Work
“Fissuring” is the now-prevalent term, coined by David Weil, for the
migration of many jobs away from the profitable branded corporations that
reign at the top of the economy. 99 Many jobs that were done in the 1950s
and 1960s within those large integrated firms—especially manufacturing and
low-wage service jobs like maintenance, cleaning, security, and food
services—have been contracted out to outside firms. Some outside firms
supply specialized services or components; others, like temporary
employment agencies, supply nothing but labor; still others, like franchisees,
take over all daily operations subject to standards set by the lead firm.
Across the board, however, workers typically end up worse off. Instead of
enjoying the relatively high wages, benefits, promotion ladders, and formal
or informal job security that used to (and may still) prevail even at the
bottom of lead firms’ “internal labor markets,” many workers are now
concentrated in low-wage supplier sectors. 100
Lower wages and widespread labor standards violations among suppliers
in many sectors is due in part to intense cost-based competition that
sharpens the incentive to cut corners. In addition, some suppliers are, or use,
or purport to use independent contractors, who are not covered by
99

See generally DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO
BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2017) (describing the
causes and effects of corporations’ growing tendency to supply labor inputs through
outsourcing, franchising, and contracting).
100
The terms “lead firm” and “supplier” are used here as shorthand for dynamics that
recur across multiple layers of the economy. A large logistics firm is a supplier for
other lead firms, but it is a lead firm relative to its own suppliers. But not all lead
firms are created equal. Those firms with a valuable consumer brand that commands
a price premium (for example, Apple, Inc.) have both capabilities and vulnerabilities
that business-to-business firms generally do not.
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employment laws. And many suppliers invest little or nothing in compliance
and have little physical capital or public reputation at risk in case of
lawbreaking or insolvency. These conditions all contribute to the decline of
wages and the erosion of labor standards that has accompanied the shift of
work away from branded, publicly-traded lead firms. Fissuring enables lead
firms to secure lower labor costs as well as a measure of insulation from the
stench of the unlawful practices that may contribute to those lower costs.
Two kinds of fissuring have drawn especially anxious attention from
scholars and advocates: the off-shoring of jobs to overseas suppliers, and the
splintering of jobs into “gigs” that are or purport to be outside the
employment nexus. China and Uber thus both stand for larger trends in the
world of work.
In seeking to reduce production costs, many firms have contracted out
labor-intensive tasks to low cost producers in developing countries. As a
result, China’s share of global manufacturing output grew from less than
three percent in 1990 to nearly twenty-five percent in 2015. 101 India, with its
large reservoir of English-language skills, has become the epicenter of
outsourced information-based services.102 The cost savings from
transnational outsourcing stem partly from lower wages and weaker
regulatory institutions and trade unions in these much poorer countries, and
partly from the same forces that depress labor standards among domestic
suppliers—cost-based competition in a concentrated low-wage, low-profit
environment. Off-shoring is one exit option that enables firms to escape
collective and regulatory efforts in more advanced economies to protect
workers or improve their wages or working conditions.
Uber represents another kind of fissuring and another exit option—one
that shifts work outside the employment nexus by disintegrating jobs into
“gigs.” 103 Drivers, writers, accountants, cleaners, artists, carpenters, care
workers, web designers, software programmers, fitness instructors, and
therapists are among those attempting to piece together a living from a
patchwork of short-term engagements, mostly as freelancers, in today’s
101

See Made in China?, ECONOMIST (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.
economist.com/news/leaders/21646204-asias-dominance-manufacturing-willendure-will-make-development-harder-others-made [https://perma.cc/FAW9PQUK].
102
India Tops 2016 Outsourcing Index, HINDU BUS. LINE (Jan. 12, 2016),
https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/info-tech/india-tops-2016-outsourcingindex/article8097482.ece [https://perma.cc/3TE5-LBWH].
103
In one sense, the “gig economy” is not that new; it is a version of industrial
piecework or the old garment industry’s “putting out system” for the service
economy. See Matthew W. Finkin, Beclouded Work, Beclouded Workers in
Historical Perspective, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 603, 604-11 (2016).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3007972

28

What Should We Do After Work?

economy. 104 Highly valuable platforms like Uber, for their part, purport to
produce nothing but the software that links consumers with the services and
servants they seek. Some of these platforms induce workers to bid against
each other in real time. And where the work can be done remotely—as with
the microtasks posted on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 105—the bidders may
include poor workers in developing countries. Some platforms thus allow
firms to exit both the employment relationship and the high wage labor
markets.
Platform-based work is one salient aspect of the larger trend toward
outsourcing of work to individual independent contractors without any of
the responsibilities and burdens that attend the employment relationship.
Those responsibilities and burdens, and the worker rights and entitlements
that they represent, are not merely passed down to less visible, profitable,
and capable employers down the line; they are vaporized.
Some freelancers prosper, and some value the greater autonomy and
flexibility of independent work. 106 But for many U.S. workers and their
families, the devolution of stable and decently paid jobs into insecure and
undependable contingent work and gigs is a socioeconomic disaster. That is
partly because of the loss of the economic security, benefits, and social
insurance programs that are, whether by law, contract, or widespread
practice, attached to employment, especially in large companies. The shift of
work away from lead firms toward leaner and meaner supplier firms, and
from long-term full-time employment toward contingent work and gigs, is
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One large recent study found that twenty to thirty percent of working-age
individuals in the United States and Europe engaged in some “independent work.”
McKinsey Global Institute, Independent Work: Choice, Necessity, and the Gig
Economy, MCKINSEY & CO. (2016),
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Global%20Themes/Employment%2
0and%20Growth/Independent%20work%20Choice%20necessity%20and%20the%2
0gig%20economy/Independent-Work-Choice-necessity-and-the-gig-economy-Fullreport.ashx [https://perma.cc/RE86-CFZ6] [hereinafter MGI, Study on Independent
Work]. Of those, most said that they did so by choice, either for their primary source
of income (30%) or for supplemental income (40%). The remainder said they did
“independent work” out of necessity, either as their primary source of income
(though they would prefer a “traditional job”) (14%), or for supplemental income
(16%). Id. at ii.
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AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com [https://perma.cc/NF52A9UN].
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See MGI, Study on Independent Work, supra note 104, at 7; see generally ARUN
SUNDARARAJAN, THE SHARING ECONOMY: THE END OF EMPLOYMENT AND THE RISE
OF CROWD-BASED CAPITALISM (2016) (detailing many facets of the sharing
economy).
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shaking the foundations of the American social model that took hold in the
New Deal era. 107
B. Three Common Causal Factors in Automation and Fissuring: Technology,
Heightened Competition, and the Costs of Employing People
Before turning to what makes automation different from fissuring, let us
first take note of three common causal forces behind all of these
developments: technology, more competitive-product and capital markets,
and the costs of human labor.
First, technology—obviously the essence of automation—has played a
crucial role in nearly every aspect of fissuring. This includes the outsourcing
to lower wage countries and platform work, by enabling firms to get the
labor inputs they need without directly supervising the workers who supply
those inputs. 108 In short, technology lowers the transaction costs associated
with explicit contracting for goods and services, or of “buying” versus
“making” necessary inputs.109 Technology enables lead firms to dis-integrate
products and processes into component parts, to set precise standards and
specifications, and to monitor closely performance and outputs of lowercost and remote outside suppliers. Technology, in the form of container
ships and bar-coding, enables Walmart meticulously to track goods from a
factory in Guangdong Province in China to a store in Lexington,
Kentucky. 110 Technology enables Apple to maintain scrupulous quality
standards while tapping into the much cheaper Chinese labor market. And it
enables Uber to monitor and control drivers, to connect them with
customers, and to allocate revenues, including a large share for itself.
Technology is just the means, however, and not the motivation for these
developments. Both fissuring and automation are driven in part by
supercharged global capital markets, in which billions of dollars move across
the world in microseconds, and globalized-product markets. 111 Firms that
107

See generally KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004) (describing the changes in the
American workplace over time); WEIL, supra note 99 (same); Katherine V.W. Stone,
The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for
Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001) (same).
108
See WEIL, supra note 99, at 54-58, 60-63, 167-74 (detailing the mechanisms by
which fissuring cuts costs).
109
See id. at 60-63, 171-74.
110
Witold Rybcyznski, Shipping News, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Aug. 10, 2006),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2006/08/10/shipping-news
[https://perma.cc/23LB-CVU6].
111
Some observers call the resulting economy “hypercapitalism.” See Marina
Vujnovic, Hypercapitalism, in THE WILEY-BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
GLOBALIZATION (George Ritzer ed., 2012).
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falter in the pursuit of cheaper means of producing goods and services risk
losing both investors and market share to more efficient producers. The
basic underlying dynamics of price, supply, and demand are hardwired into
the market economy, although national and transnational policies have
fostered the growth of transnational firms, networks, and supply chains, and
have eased the movement of goods, services, and capital across national
boundaries. 112 Technology has obviously accelerated all of those
movements. But firms use technology to eliminate or outsource jobs only
when it generates higher returns to capital through lower production costs
or higher productivity or both.
Automation is thus part of a larger menu of options by which those who
own or manage capital seek to maximize their returns. Those who supply the
robots and the algorithms that replace human labor and destroy jobs are
responding to demand from firms seeking more profitable ways to produce
other goods and services. All of these related trends—the development of
far-flung supply chains, domestic outsourcing of labor-intensive functions,
franchising of food service and hospitality services, and the rise of platformbased service providers—reflect the growing ability of lead firms to secure
labor inputs without directly employing people. If robots or algorithms can
supply those inputs more quickly, more reliably, more cheaply, or with less
risk, so it will be.
That points to a third factor driving all these developments: the effort to
reduce or avoid the costs and risks of employing human beings. For many
labor scholars and advocates, it is distressing to realize the extent to which
that factor drives trends in the organization and automation of work.
Investment banker Steven Berkenfeld made the point in vivid terms at a
2015 Department of Labor (DOL) conference on the future of work:
As I talk to companies, yes, it’s about labor savings, but that’s just the
starting point. It’s also about indirect cost savings . . . . It’s about health
care liabilities, lawsuits[,] and insurance and disabilities benefits. And . . .
people need people. There is a whole management infrastructure that
needs to go on top of every person that you employ; it’s a multiplier
effect. 113
Still more disheartening to labor advocates, managers report that “people are
a pain to manage”:
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For a thoughtful discussion of this phenomenon, see Dani Rodrik, The
Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy (2011).
113
Steven Berkenfeld, Managing Dir., Barclays Capital, Presentation at the U.S.
Department of Labor Future of Work Symposium (Dec. 10, 2015) (transcript on file
with author).
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They have to be identified and recruited, hired and trained. They want
performance reviews and promotions. They take vacations; they get sick;
their kids get sick; their parents get sick; they get pregnant; they get
injured on the job. Sometimes they don’t get along with each other.
They sue for harassment. They need all kinds of insurance and benefits.
They want raises and career development, and then sometimes they quit.
Then you have to start it all over again. . . . [People] have needs, issues,
and ambitions. And perhaps most significantly from a CEO’s
standpoint, they do dumb things. They give bribes and kickbacks, they
discriminate and harass, they expose companies to cyber-attacks, they
commit acts of negligence, misconduct, and violence, and sometimes
they even deliberately sabotage. They create liabilities, they damage
brands and they sometimes get CEOs fired . . . .114
Berkenfeld’s bottom line brought an audible gasp from the mostly laborfriendly audience at the DOL conference: “[S]ome CEOs . . . will do
anything possible, they’ll explore all other alternatives so as not to hire
another full-time employee.” 115 As he put the point more recently, CEOs
these days ask, “Can I automate it? If not, can I outsource it? If not, can I
give it to an independent contractor?” In other words, “[h]iring an employee
is the last resort.” 116
The role of labor costs in outsourcing and other forms of fissuring is
well established. 117 Their role in spurring automation can similarly come as
no surprise. After all, a basic postulate of labor economics holds that
increases in the cost of labor—whether due to market forces, legal
mandates, or collective bargaining—tend to lead firms to substitute capital,
including technology, for labor. 118 The growing capabilities and falling cost
of labor-saving technology relative to the cost of labor make the substitution
of technological capital for labor ever more appealing.
Equally unsurprising is the fact that some labor costs, and thus some
part of the motivation for both automation and fissuring, stem from labor
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Id.
Id.
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Stephen McBride, How the Coming Wave of Job Automation Will Affect You and
the U.S., FORBES (Feb. 23, 2017),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/oliviergarret/2017/02/23/how-the-coming-wave-of-jobautomation-will-affect-you-and-the-us/#29bebb963fd7 [http://perma.cc/8BTE4U9S].
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See, e.g., WEIL, supra note 99.
118
RICHARD FREEMAN & JAMES MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? (1984). That
dynamic helped to drive rising productivity and prosperity, broadly shared during the
middle of the twentieth century. As we have observed, experts debate whether that is
now changing as automation destroys more and better jobs than it helps to create.
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and employment laws. 119 Some laws add predictable direct costs, such as
payroll taxes for workers’ compensation and unemployment insurance,
Social Security, and Medicare, which can add eighteen to twenty-six percent
to the base salary cost. 120 Minimum wage rates obviously affect direct labor
costs at the bottom of the labor market.121 Overtime laws and the “pay or
play” employer mandates of the Affordable Care Act (ACA)—as long as
they exist—may increase direct costs much further up the wage scale.122
Labor economists generally assume that the cost of these mandates is borne
by employees through lower wages—down to the point at which minimum
wage laws block further wage reductions. 123 If that is so, then these laws
mainly add to the cost of employing low wage workers. But evidence is
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Charlotte Alexander has explored firms’ ability to restructure work to avoid the
costs of legal mandates—for example, by using independent contractors or reducing
employee work hours below a minimum threshold for coverage (e.g., the Affordable
Care Act’s employer pay-or-play obligations accrue only for employees working
more than 30 hours per week). Charlotte S. Alexander, Legal Avoidance and the
Restructuring of Work, in THE STRUCTURE AND STRUCTURING OF WORK IN
ORGANIZATIONS 311 (M. Diane Burton et al. eds., 2016). Automation may be an
even better legal avoidance strategy.
120
For a breakdown of the non-wage direct costs of each employee, see Jose
Pagliery, You Make $70k but Cost Your Boss $88k, CNN MONEY (Feb. 28, 2013,
9:16 AM ET), https://money.cnn.com/2013/02/28/smallbusiness/salarybenefits/index.html [https://perma.cc/RD5C-J4AH].
121
On the economic impact of minimum wage levels, see infra Section II.D.
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For example, the ACA covers employers with more than fifty employees, but
only with regard to employees working over thirty hours per week. Most early
studies found modest effects on employers’ costs and employment levels. See, e.g.,
Jean Abraham & Anne Beeson Royalty, How Has the Affordable Care Act Affected
Work and Wages?, LEONARD DAVIS INST. HEALTH ECON. (Jan. 19, 2017),
https://ldi.upenn.edu/brief/how-has-affordable-care-act-affected-work-and-wages
[https://perma.cc/L59D-BTMS]; Fredric Blavin et al., Monitoring the Impact of the
Affordable Care Act on Employers, URB. INST. (Oct. 2014),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/33696/413273-Monitoring-theImpact-of-the-Affordable-Care-Act-on-Employers.PDF [https://perma.cc/BNB58NGP].
123
See Alan B. Krueger & Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Economics of Employer Versus
Individual Mandates, 13 HEALTH AFF. 34 (1994); Lawrence H. Summers, What Can
Economics Contribute to Social Policy?: Some Simple Economics of Mandated
Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 177, 180 (1989); John Olson, What Are Payroll Taxes
and Who Pays Them?, TAX FOUND. (July 25, 2016), https://taxfoundation.org/whatare-payroll-taxes-and-who-pays-them [https://perma.cc/9F2G-CN3A]. The cost of
new mandates may also fall on employers (or consumers), at least temporarily,
because it is notoriously hard to actually cut wages for current workers. See TRUMAN
F. BEWLEY, WHY WAGES DON’T FALL DURING A RECESSION 173-80 (1999). They
are more likely to offer slower wage increases to incumbents or lower starting wages
to new hires. Id. at 1, 131.
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mixed on whether the assumption holds, and whether employers—whose
decisions about employment are at the heart of the matter—believe it.124
Other laws increase the cost of employing people in less predictable
ways; they are a source of risk. Consider the bevy of laws prohibiting
discrimination, harassment, or retaliation. Litigation under those laws entails
both tangible and intangible costs, such as harm to reputation. Employees
may be on both sides of litigation, as when employees or ex-employees sue
over other employees’ misconduct, mistakes, or misjudgments for which the
employer is liable. Employees can mistakenly or maliciously trigger
corporate liabilities not only under employment laws but also under
environmental laws, tax and securities laws, consumer protection laws, and
other laws regulating corporate conduct. Large corporate compliance
departments, which cost large firms billions of dollars per year, are devoted
to avoiding or managing these risks and liabilities (not to mention those risks
created by deliberate managerial decisions).125
Union organizing, strikes, and other activities that are protected by
federal labor law pose another sort of risk. Most private-sector employees
have the right under federal labor law to form a union, engage in collective
bargaining, and collectively pressure, criticize, or boycott their employer
(whether or not through a union). 126 The direct costs stemming from the
labor laws, including the cost of violating those laws, are small; but when
workers exercise their rights through collective agitation and organizing, the
costs can be substantial (though only obliquely traceable to the law). Firms
spend a lot of money on “union avoidance” consultants in part to avoid
those costs and risks. 127
124

For evidence that employers in fact bear a large share of payroll taxes, see Daniel
S. Hamermesh, New Estimates of the Incidence of the Payroll Tax, 45 SOUTHERN
ECON. J. 1208 (1979). On employer beliefs regarding who pays for employment
taxes, see id. at 1217; Krueger & Reinhardt, supra note 123, at 43.
125
HSBC, for example, anticipated spending $3.3 billion on regulatory and
compliance actions in 2017 alone. Richard Partington, Banks Trimming Compliance
Staff as $321 Billion in Fines Abate, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 22, 2017, 8:01 PM EDT),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-23/banks-trimming-compliancestaff-as-321-billion-in-fines-abate [https://perma.cc/S4NN-WVX7]. Interestingly,
firms are finding ways to automate some compliance tasks. Id.
126
See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
127
How much they spend is unclear. See Michael Hiltzik, Labor Dept. Finally Closes
a Loophole Favoring Union-Busters—After 57 Years, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2016,
4:02 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-union-busting20160323-snap-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/6UX6-DSE9]; Dave Jamieson, It’s
About to Get Harder for Companies to Hide Union-Busting, HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 23, 2016, 12:01 AM EST), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/unionbusting-persuader-rule_us_56f1bdcbe4b0c3ef52172770 [https://perma.cc/HK4W-
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Labor and employment laws thus account for part of the cost of
employing humans. Some legal mandates could yield countervailing
productivity gains through lower turnover or higher employee morale and
motivation. But most of the productivity gains that might be attributable to
higher wages and benefits (according to “efficiency wage” theory) depend
on their being voluntary and above what either the law or the market
demands; that is what helps employers recruit and retain employees who
might otherwise go elsewhere, and induce reciprocal loyalty in the form of
higher effort. 128 That dynamic cannot be reproduced through across-theboard minimum standards.
It is hardly a revelation that employment laws add to the cost of
employing humans. Nor is that a reason by itself to oppose those laws.
From a societal standpoint, those laws might serve allocative efficiency by
mitigating negative externalities or overcoming collective action problems;
or they might serve just distributional ends or other overriding noneconomic
values. 129 But none of those social gains undercuts firms’ private incentive to
avoid or evade those laws and their costs if they can do so. And increasingly
they can do so—in part through fissuring, but more completely through
automation. Automation is an entirely lawful—indeed, almost unassailable—
way to avoid the costs of employing people.
C. Why Automation Is Different
So while automation is in one sense just another tool in the toolbox of
firms seeking to reduce the costs and risks associated with in-house labor,
automation is also different. Rather than separating human workers from
those who use and profit from their labor, automation replaces human labor
8ZJZ]; Noam Scheiber, Rule to Require Employers to Disclose Use of Anti-Union
Consultants, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/24/business/economy/union-labor-regulationconsultant-relationships.html [https://perma.cc/X5WU-6QAH].
128
See Lawrence F. Katz, Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation, 1 NBER
MACROECONOMICS ANN. 235 (1986); Michael L. Wachter, Neoclassical Labor
Economics: Its Implications for Labor and Employment Law, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 20, 28-29
(Cynthia L. Estlund & Michael L. Wachter eds., 2012).
129
See Christine Jolls, Employment Law and the Labor Market 2 (NBER Working
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 13230, 2007) (arguing that, “[i]n the presence of a
market failure, legal intervention through employment law may both enhance
efficiency and make employees better off”); see also Alain Supiot, Law and Labour:
A World Market of Norms?, NEW LEFT REVIEW, May-June 2006, at 120 (arguing that
the law can and should serve noneconomic, human values; for example, claiming
that “[i]t is the law’s task to widen or restrict the scope of free trade, according to
whether it enhances human development or robs people of their livelihoods and
plunges them into poverty”).
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inputs from any source. Where automation is feasible and cost-effective, it
offers the ultimate exit from the costs, risks, and hassles of employing
people, including those that stem from the law of work.
Fissuring can partially but not totally insulate lead firms from the
workers who perform outsourced tasks and from the blowback that may hit
even faraway lead firms when those workers suffer abuse. But robots have
no human rights to be violated and no bodies to be bruised or battered.
Their treatment provokes no brand-scarring scandals like those that hit
Apple when a dozen Foxconn workers committed suicide in 2010, or when
others were injured in explosions or suffered nerve damage from the use of
dangerous chemicals in the manufacture of iPhones and iPads. 130 Robots do
not commit suicide and they do not suffer nerve damage.
Robots also do not demand higher wages or form unions or go on
strike, as humans sometimes do. It was partly the high wages and benefits
that American blue-collar workers had fought for over many decades that
drove much manufacturing to China. But average wages in China rose by a
factor of ten from 1990 to 2015. 131 That is partly because Chinese workers
themselves have been demanding higher wages, and that has helped to move
a government that is anxious to avoid labor conflict to raise minimum wages
and other labor standards. 132 Higher wages in China have pushed some
130

Tania Branigan, Chinese Workers Link Sickness to N-Hexane and Apple iPhone
Screens, GUARDIAN (May 7, 2010, 1:50 PM EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/07/chinese-workers-sickness-hexaneapple-iphone [https://perma.cc/G8SG-9BSB]; Nick Statt, iPhone Manufacturer
Foxconn Plans to Replace Almost Every Human Worker with Robots, VERGE (Dec.
30, 2016, 5:07 PM EST), http://www.theverge.com/2016/12/30/14128870/foxconnrobots-automation-apple-iphone-china-manufacturing [https://perma.cc/KH26GY53].
131
See Jiaxing & Yangon, A Tightening Grip: Rising Chinese Wages Will Only
Strengthen Asia’s Hold on Manufacturing, ECONOMIST (Mar. 12, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21646180-rising-chinese-wages-will-onlystrengthen-asias-hold-manufacturing-tightening-grip [https://perma.cc/GU6CQKN7].
132
See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, A NEW DEAL FOR CHINA’S WORKERS? (2017). Rising
wages and labor standards in China (and elsewhere) reflect some profound social
forces. Karl Polanyi famously argued that the spread of capitalist markets and the
commodification of labor have historically tended to provoke a countermovement—
both collective agitation and political mobilization—in pursuit of social protection
against harsh market forces and managers. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT
TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2d ed.
2001). The countermovement to socialize markets is far from inevitable or
mechanical, especially in countries without democratic political institutions. Even in
authoritarian China, however, political leaders have found it necessary to respond to
the spread of labor unrest by ramping up regulation and raising wages and labor
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suppliers to poorer countries with cheaper labor; but it has pushed others to
automate their Chinese factories, as we have seen. 133 Some manufacturing
has even returned stateside, but to factories equipped with robots and 3D
printers, and staffed with a relative handful of workers who are more likely
to have an engineering degree than just a high school diploma. 134
Even if workers demand only a decent living wage—as the “Fight for
Fifteen” does in many high-cost U.S. cities—they may bolster the case for
automation. Andrew Puzder, a fast-food CEO and President Trump’s first
nominee for Secretary of Labor, made the point in more colloquial terms:
“If you’re making labor more expensive, and automation less expensive—
this is not rocket science.” 135 The first burger-flipping robots might be
expensive relative to low-wage fast food workers. But as innovation races
forward, the machines get cheaper and more efficient, while labor usually
does not. At some point the up-front investment will be worthwhile, if not
obligatory, for firms in a competitive market.
Unlike human labor, machines tend inexorably to get both more capable
and cheaper over time. 136 The falling cost and expanding capabilities of
robots and algorithms stem from the mysterious but much studied dynamics
of innovation. In response to firms’ demand for ways to lower costs and
increase productivity, tech firms on the supply side race to improve the
capabilities and lower the cost of the technologies that enable both fissuring
and automation. 137
In short, technological innovation outpaces human evolution. That
oversimplifies things, of course; for example, education can broaden human
capabilities. But the functional capabilities of machines are rising faster and
with fewer apparent natural limits than those of humans. At the same time,
humans are unable, even if they are willing, to keep pace with the falling cost
of machines. The organizational innovations under the rubric of fissuring,
though facilitated by technology, still run up against the upper bounds of

standards. See ELI FRIEDMAN, INSURGENCY TRAP: LABOR POLITICS IN
POSTSOCIALIST CHINA (2014).
133
Jiaxing & Yangon, supra note 131.
134
Rothfeder, supra note #.
135
Kate Taylor, Fast-Food CEO Says He’s Investing in Machines Because the
Government Is Making it Difficult to Afford Employees, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 16,
2016, 5:30 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/carls-jr-wants-open-automatedlocation-2016-3 [https://perma.cc/HT2N-44CX].
136
FORD, supra note 3.
137
See Hrdy, supra note 98 (questioning whether society necessarily benefits from
speeding the pace of labor-saving innovations, as intellectual property protections
can do).
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human performance and the lower bounds of the cost of sustaining human
beings and reproducing their labor. Automation transcends both.
So automation is different from the various forms of fissuring that have
drawn so much attention from labor scholars in recent years. Automation
offers firms the ultimate exit from the costs and burdens of employing
human labor, including those stemming from the large body of law,
developed over centuries, that regulates human labor and the sometimescomplex relationships between the users and the suppliers of labor. That is
unsettling. But it reflects another basic difference between automation and
fissuring: automation simply obviates some of the problems that the law of
work addresses. It reduces workers’ exposure to occupational illness or
injury, discrimination, retaliation, or excessive hours. To the extent that
robots replace human workers in dangerous jobs, OSHA (or its Chinese
counterpart) has no role to play, for there are no hazards to abate or
regulate. So, too, with excessive work hours or discrimination.
The law of work is largely concerned with ensuring decent terms and
conditions of work in whatever jobs exist. Indeed, it reflects a societal
judgment about what jobs should and should not exist. But it does not seek
to ensure that jobs do exist, nor to compel firms to use humans to do things
that machines can do better or cheaper or both, nor to hold firms
responsible for the humans whose labor they no longer need. 138 Unrelated
bodies of law—environmental or consumer safety regulations, for
example—might be deployed in ways that deliberately or incidentally slow
the destruction of jobs. Concerns about traffic safety, whether real or
misplaced, might thus slow down the advent of autonomous vehicles and
thus the displacement of millions of U.S workers who make their living by
driving cars or trucks. 139 But the law of work itself simply isn’t designed to
preserve jobs or to slow the pace of job destruction in the private sector.
To be sure, a “right to work”—a right to a job and a corresponding duty
of government to promote full employment—has been a recurring demand
from left-liberals since the New Deal, 140 and finds support in international
138

Apart from a bare-bones system of temporary unemployment compensation for
those who are actually laid off.
139
See Why Waiting for Perfect Autonomous Vehicles May Cost Lives, RAND CORP.
(Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.rand.org/blog/articles/2017/11/why-waiting-for-perfectautonomous-vehicles-may-cost-lives.html .
140
The “right to work” touted by organized labor (as distinct from the anti-union
“right-to-work” banner that is more familiar in U.S. public discourse) has a long
tradition in the United States. See, e.g., Senator Huey P. Long, Statement of the
Share Our Wealth Movement (May 23, 1935), in Congressional Record, 74th Cong.,
1st sess., Vol. 79, 8040-43; Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Showdown for Nonviolence,
Look, Vol. 32, April 16, at 24 (calling for an “economic bill of rights,” which
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labor law theory and advocacy. 141 But that “right,” even when it has come
closest to realization, is not part of the U.S. law of work as such. 142
D. How Automation Confounds Prevailing Approaches to the Regulation of Work
That does not mean, however, that the law of work is irrelevant to the
issue of automation-related job loss. To whatever extent labor and
employment law adds to the cost of human labor (without boosting its
productivity), it tilts firms’ calculus toward labor-saving technologies. 143 The
effect is likely greater at the low end of the labor market, where many highly
automatable jobs reside, and where minimum-wage levels prevent firms
from shifting the cost of legal mandates onto employees through lower
wages. Especially at the bottom of the labor market, raising the floor on
wages, benefits, and working conditions through employer mandates
strengthens the business case for automation of technically automatable
jobs.
That surely includes large increases in the minimum wage. The impact of
raising the minimum wage on employment levels is debated among
economists. Twenty years ago, Daniel Shaviro observed that “[m]ost
economists of all ideological persuasions have long agreed that [the
minimum wage] is self-defeating: it destroys jobs in the low-wage sector of

“would guarantee a job to all people who want to work and are able to work.”). For
more recent calls among left-liberals for a government-backed jobs guarantee, see,
e.g., Sean McElwee, Colin McAuliffe and Jon Green, Why Democrats Should
Embrace a Feder Jobs Guarantee, March 20, 2018,
https://www.thenation.com/article/why-democrats-should-embrace-a-federal-jobsguarantee; Mark Paul, William Darity, Jr. & Darrick Hamilton, The Federal Job
Guarantee—A Policy to Achieve Permanent Full Employment, March 9, 2018,
https://www.cbpp.org/research/full-employment/the-federal-job-guarantee-a-policyto-achieve-permanent-full-employment; Neera Tanden, Carmel Martin, Marc
Jarsulic, Brendan Duke, Ben Olinsky, Melissa Boteach, John Halpin, Ruy Teixeira,
and Rob Griffin, Toward a Marshall Plan for America: Rebuilding Our Towns,
Cities, and the Middle Class, May 16, 2017,
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2017/05/16/432499/towar
d-marshall-plan-america.
141
For an excellent collection of essays offering theoretical, comparative, and
historical perspectives on the “right to work,” see THE RIGHT TO WORK: LEGAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Virginia Mantouvalou, ed.) (2015). This line of
inquiry is beyond the scope of this Article, though it is one that I plan to include in
future work on the topic.
142
See Katherine V.W. Stone, A Right to Work in the United States: Historical
Antecedents and Contemporary Possibilities, in THE RIGHT TO WORK, supra note
141, at 275.
143
The McKinsey study makes that clear. MGI, A Future that Works, supra note 28,
at 7, 67-70.
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the economy and thus hurts many of the people it is intended to help.”144
The much-debated Card and Kruger studies in the 1990s, 145 and some more
recent empirical studies, have challenged that consensus. 146 Others discount
those studies and hold to the orthodox position. 147 While the debate
continues with regard to moderate increases in the minimum wage, most
economists would now agree that small increases do not matter much, and
that large increases generally do lead to job losses, at least among the least
skilled workers. 148 At any point along either spectrum, however—from small
to large increases in the minimum wage, or from orthodoxy to heterodoxy—
the growing capabilities and falling costs of automation are bound to tilt the
scales to some degree toward displacement of workers.
Puzder’s comment cited above (“it’s not rocket science”) makes the
well-nigh irrefutable point that the business case for automation is stronger
if direct wage costs are $15 an hour versus $8 an hour. Puzder was
excoriated by workers’ advocates for preferring robots to workers. 149 But at
144

Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and
Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 405, 406 (1997).
145
See DAVID E. CARD & ALAN B. KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT: THE NEW
ECONOMICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE (1995). For a critique of the methodology of the
Card & Kruger studies, see Shaviro, supra note 144.
146
See Arindrajit Dube, T. William Lester, & Michael Reich, Minimum Wage Effects
Across State Borders: Estimates Using Contiguous Counties (Inst. for Research on
Labor and Emp’t, IRLE Working Paper No. 157-07, 2010),
https://irle.berkeley.edu/files/2010/Minimum-Wage-Effects-Across-StateBorders.pdf. For a round-up of recent studies finding no impact of (usually modest)
increases in minimum wage levels on employment, see Holly Sklar, Research Shows
Minimum Wage Increases Do Not Cause Job Loss, BUS. FAIR MINIMUM WAGE,
https://www.business forafairminimumwage.org/news/00135/research-showsminimum-wage-increases-do-not-cause-job-loss.
147
See David Neumark, The Effects of Minimum Wages on Employment, FSRBF
ECON. LETTER (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/
publications/economic-letter/2015/december/effects-of-minimum-wage-onemployment.
148
See supra note --. For example, liberal economist Jared Bernstein, based on
recent studies including Dube, Lester & Reich, supra note 146, concludes: “I don’t
think we should worry too much about the impact of moderate minimum wage
increases on labor substitution. . . . Large minimum wage increases, like going to $15
in places with low wages, are another story,” and may need to be phased in slowly.
See Jared Bernstein, Minimum Wages and Capital/Labor Substitution, ON THE
ECON.: JARED BERNSTEIN BLOG (Aug. 17, 2015),
https://jaredbernsteinblog.com/minimum-wages-and-capitallaborsubstitution.
149
Michael Hiltzik, Andy Puzder, Trump’s Choice for Labor Secretary, Is a Good
Spokesman for Fast-Food Restaurant Owners. For Their Employees, Not So Much,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2016, 1:40 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fihiltzik-puzder-labor-20161208-story.html [https://perma.cc/9P7T-JQBW].
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the point that robots can perform as well as humans or better at a lower
cost, they will be irresistible for firms in competitive markets, lest those
firms lose profits, market share and investors. That is indeed “not rocket
science”; it is Capitalism 101. And if we can no longer count on new job
creation to offset the jobs that will be lost, those who advocate significant
hikes in the minimum wage—or in any other material labor standards that
raise employer costs—face a dilemma.
A similar dilemma plagues the prevailing legal responses to fissuring.
Even as law-related labor costs tend to promote fissuring in all its varied
forms, including the disintegration of jobs into “gigs,” fissuring tends to
undermine labor standards and the employment-based social model. Faced
with this very big problem, labor scholars have converged on a solution with
several variations: shore up the employment relationship, or what I call the
“fortress of employment,” by expanding lead firms’ responsibility for the
wages and working conditions of the workers whose labor they use. 150
Hence the proliferation of scholarship and advocacy aimed at combatting
misclassification of employees as independent contractors and at expanding
the definition of “employment,” including the scope of “joint employment,”
so that it is harder for lead firms to escape responsibility for complying with
labor standards. Other scholars have proposed more radically reconstructing
the concept of employment, 151 or dismantling the distinction between
employees and independent contractors, 152 or creating an intermediate
category between the highly regulated employment relationship and the freewheeling domain of freedom of contract. 153
Nearly all of these proposals aim to expand the responsibility of firms
for the people who supply their labor inputs. That is, they aim to extend to
those firms some or all of the legal costs and burdens that are conventionally
tied to employment, and to extend to some “self-employed” individuals the
corresponding benefits and protections. The effort to expand firms’
150

See WEIL, supra note 99.
See Jeremias Prassl, The Concept of the Employer (2015).
152
See Judy Fudge, Eric Tucker & Leah Vosko, Changing Boundaries of
Employment: Developing a New Platform for Labour Law, 10 CANAD. LAB. & EMPL.
L.J. 329 (2003).
153
See GUY DAVIDOV, A PURPOSIVE APPROACH TO LABOUR LAW (2016); Harry W.
Arthurs, The Dependent Contractor: A Study of the Legal Problems of
Countervailing Power, 16 UNIV. TORONTO L.J. 89 (1965). A more recent proposal in
the United States along these lines focuses on the status of “platform-based” workers
such as Uber drivers. See Seth Harris & Alan Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing
Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: The “Independent Worker,” HAMILTON
PROJECT (Dec. 2015),
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_fi
rst_century_work_krueger_harris.pdf [http://perma.cc/66AB-G82M].
151
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responsibility for workers whom they do not formally employ is vehemently
opposed by some in the business community, who argue that it will squelch
innovation, flexibility, and, ultimately, economic growth. 154 But corporations
do not merely oppose these efforts; they can often evade them by rewriting
contracts and reconfiguring supplier relationships to avoid employer
status. 155 Smart legal tests of “employment” aim to defeat that response by
ignoring the formalities that are most easily manipulated by firms, and
focusing on functional issues of control (however exercised), integration into
the firm’s operations, or genuine entrepreneurial autonomy of the worker.156
If firms have to pay a functional price to avoid employer responsibilities,
more workers will remain under the legal umbrella of employment.
The exit option of automation, however, confounds this otherwise
sensible strategy of stretching the scope of employment and employer
responsibility. The more successful worker advocates are in holding lead
firms responsible as employers for the workers who supply their labor
inputs, the more those firms have an incentive to replace workers altogether
through automation where that is feasible. 157 In other words, if McDonalds,
Inc., is held to be the employer of its franchisees’ employees, or if Uber is
held to be the employer of its drivers, those firms are marginally more likely
to turn to burger-flipping robots or self-driving vehicles.
An analogous dilemma recurs in the ever-evolving response to firms’
offshoring of operations to lower-cost, less-regulated jurisdictions. Echoing
the domestic strategy of expanding the scope of employer responsibility,
advocates and scholars have sought to develop transnational regulatory
tools—some of them “soft law,” others with harder edges—that would
declare and enforce multinational corporations’ “social responsibility” for
labor conditions within their supply chains. 158 Progress has been halting, and
firms’ public commitments outstrip actual improvements on the ground.159
But we are very far from the days when big consumer brands could respond
154

In the face of that opposition, the Labor Department recently revoked an Obamaera rule expanding the definition of joint employment. See Sean Higgins, Labor
Department Rescinds Expanded ‘Joint Employer’ Rule, WASH. EXAMINER (June 7,
2017, 11:29 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/labor-department-rescindsexpanded-joint-employer-rule [http://perma.cc/57NC-PGUH].
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WEIL, supra note 99, at 31.
156
See DAVIDOV, supra note 153, at --.
157
Where automation is not feasible, or where it entails a significant loss in quality
of services, the fortress strategy may have the desired effect of inducing lead firms
either to monitor contractors’ labor practices or to bring contracted-out work back
into the firm.
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See Cynthia Estlund, Regoverning the Workplace: From Self-Regulation to CoRegulation (2010).
159
Id. at --.
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to reports of labor abuses in their supply chain—for example, child labor or
forced labor—by claiming they were “just the buyer.”160
Automation complicates this strategy, too. The more successful global
labor regulators and advocates are in holding firms politically, socially, or
even legally responsible for the labor conditions of workers in their global
supply chain, the more those lead firms and their suppliers have an incentive
to switch to robots. Recall the rash of negative publicity about injuries to the
Foxconn workers who assemble Apple’s iPhones and iPads. 161 For Apple,
one side benefit of Foxconn’s ambitious plan to replace most of its Chinese
workers with robots—starting with the most dangerous jobs—is that it will
neatly sidestep most future scandals of this nature.
There is a powerful logic behind the multifaceted efforts of advocates
and scholars to reconnect the most profitable and capable firms with the
wages and working conditions of the workers, foreign and domestic, who
supply necessary labor inputs. But this sensible response to fissuring not
only fails to meet the looming though uncertain challenge of automationbased job loss; it also tends further to tilt firms’ calculus away from human
labor and toward machines.
At the same time, the Apple-Foxconn case illustrates again the doubleedged nature of automation for workers. Automation is enabling Foxconn
to eliminate some very dangerous jobs, as well as hundreds of thousands of
other jobs whose grueling nature was blamed for a spate of worker suicides
in 2010. 162 If the displaced workers end up with better jobs at equal or better
wages, this case may show innovation and creative destruction at their most
virtuous. If not, it may illustrate the double-edged nature of efforts to hold
lead firms responsible for upstream working conditions, at least for poor
workers who lack decent alternatives. That does not mean we should
abandon those efforts, but we should proceed with eyes wide open, and be
on the lookout for ways to mitigate the dilemma they pose.

160

See ENFORCEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION: ENSURING COMPLIANCE IN
A GLOBAL WORLD 241 (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2012) (recounting that when early
anti- sweatshop activists sought to hold companies like Gap, Nike, and Wal-Mart
accountable for the conditions of their suppliers’ workers, Nike claimed to be “just
the buyer”).
161
See Charles Duhigg & David Barboza, In China, Human Costs Are Built into an
iPad, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/
ieconomy-apples-ipad-and-the-human-costs-for-workers-in-china.html
[https://perma.cc/5KSE-RB8G].
162
David Barboza, After Suicides, Scrutiny of China’s Grim Factories, N.Y. TIMES
(June 6, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/business/global/07suicide.html
[https://perma.cc/TN7W-UFAQ].
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III. A Way Forward in the Face of Uncertainty
Workers, their organizations, and their advocates have long struggled to
raise labor standards, expand employee rights and benefits, and improve
their enforcement. For present purposes, we may assume that those labor
standards, rights, and benefits serve the interests of workers and the society
as a whole; to a great extent, they represent our evolving societal conception
of “decent work.” But to private firms, most of those entitlements entail net
labor costs or risks that are worth avoiding if possible—in effect, they tax
the employment of human labor. Fissuring strategies enable firms to avoid
or evade some of those costs, and legal efforts to extend the scope of direct
or joint employer responsibility aim to make that more difficult. Automation
sidesteps those efforts and more completely avoids the costs of human
labor, including those stemming from the law. The automation option
obviously becomes ever more compelling as the cost of machines falls and
their capabilities rise.
All in all, it is hard to dodge the conclusion that labor costs stemming
from employment laws are among the factors that lead firms to automate
jobs and replace people, thus accelerating what might be an inevitable
decline in the overall demand for human labor, especially in decent mid-level
jobs. That is a serious concern if, as I have argued, a relatively rapid process
of automation will make it much harder for individuals, institutions, and
society as a whole to mount responses that mitigate the losses and spread
the gains from automation. The conclusion might seem to point in a
direction that would be highly dispiriting to worker advocates and many
labor and employment law scholars: perhaps we should now be looking for
judicious ways to unburden or deregulate the employment relationship so as
to slow down, or avoid speeding up, automation-related job losses.
There are reasons to resist this “unburdening” strategy, even apart from
the basic uncertainty about the future net impact of automation on
employment, and I will turn to them below. But first, we must address that
basic uncertainty, for it has important implications for the strategy going
forward, and for whether and in what ways to “unburden” employment.
This Part will frame the objectives of an optimal strategy, illustrate how the
strategy would work in several contexts, and defend it against some
objections.
A. Framing a Strategy in the Face of Uncertainty
As discussed in Part I, the prospect that automation will produce sizable
net job losses and growing wage disparities in the next decade or two is
uncertain and hotly debated, including among those who are chiefly
concerned with the well-being of ordinary workers. There is disagreement as
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well over whether a net decline in the demand for labor might be a boon for
most people (at least given the political will and capacity more fairly to
distribute leisure, income, and the work that remains). There is much less
controversy, however, about three related problems: (i) growing economic
inequality and (ii) erosion of labor standards, both of which stem partly from (iii)
the fissuring of work. That is, there is wider agreement both that those trends
exist and that they are detrimental to workers and society. I do not intend to
argue those points further here and, for example, to rehearse arguments that
our economy is too unequal and that redistribution to some degree and in
some form would be desirable. I will take those propositions as given.
Given the relative certainty and consensus about inequality, erosion of
labor standards, and fissuring, one might conclude that we should put a
priority on addressing those problems rather than the more uncertain
prospect of automation-related job losses. Unfortunately, as this Article has
shown, the prevailing responses within labor and employment law to the
former set of problems—that is, raising minimum labor standards and
mandatory benefits and expanding the reach of employer responsibility for
compliance—are likely to accelerate the loss of jobs to automation and
increase the risk of net job losses.
Can we avoid the opposite problem in framing a response to the
uncertain threat of automation to the future of work? That is, can we
mitigate the latter threat while also addressing, or at least not exacerbating,
the problems of fissuring, inequality, and deteriorating labor standards?
Without pretending magically to dissolve the dilemmas flagged above, I
believe it is possible to devise a strategy that will make some significant
progress on all these fronts. It is possible, in short, to reduce the legal tax on
employment—and thus marginally reduce firms’ incentive both to replace
human workers with machines and to replace employees with contractors—
while improving the quality of work and of life for most workers.
It seems axiomatic that reducing the legal tax on employment, and thus
reducing the cost of labor, will tend to reduce firms’ incentive to outsource
labor needs and to automate them. 163 The challenge is to do that while
maintaining or improving labor standards and mitigating inequality. The first
step in meeting that challenge lies in separating the normative question of
which entitlements workers should have from the question of where the
163

Indeed, to the degree that law does effectively tax the employment of human
labor (as opposed to being borne by employees in the form of a lower cash wage, see
supra ---), it presumably distorts firms’ demand for labor versus capital in the form
of labor-saving technology. See Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 98, at 152.
Reducing that tax would thus improve economic efficiency as well as slow the loss
of jobs to automation.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3007972

What Should We Do After Work?

45

attendant costs should fall, or how the entitlements should be financed. (I
use the term “entitlements” here, despite its political baggage, to encompass
all of the rights, protections, benefits, and minimum labor standards to
which workers are entitled by law.) The latter question, I will argue, is more
practical than normative. In some cases it makes sense to put the costs of
workers’ entitlements on those who employ them, or more broadly on those
who use their labor. But in some cases it does not.
Separating the question of what workers’ entitlements should be from
the question of how they should be paid for opens up constructive
possibilities on three fronts. It allows for reducing the labor-andemployment-law tax on the use of human labor; for expanding some rights
and benefits to non-employed workers; and, more than incidentally, for
achieving some beneficial redistribution of income in a more efficient
fashion.
B. Employee Entitlements that are Inextricable from Employer Mandates
Some of the hard-won rights and protections of workers necessarily
entail duties and burdens on those who employ them. 164 That is true, for
example, of laws regulating workplace hazards. Employers exercise actual or
potential control over many aspects of workplace safety for their employees.
Forcing them to abate hazards and to internalize the costs of occupational
injuries and disease gives them an incentive to exercise that control to avoid
those losses. The point holds as well for laws prohibiting discrimination and
retaliation (against whistleblowers, for example). The employing firm causes
the harms addressed by these laws—both the harms to individual employees
and the social harms of discrimination and retaliation. Forcing the firm to
answer for those harms deters misconduct and encourages organizational
precautions.
The point is not that these laws impose no costs or tradeoffs on
employers. If compliance entails a net cost to employers that they cannot
pass on to workers through lower wages, they are presumably marginally
more likely to replace those workers with machines. That tradeoff should be
investigated and considered by advocates and policymakers in deciding
whether to legislate minimum terms and conditions of employment. But
some tradeoffs between the number of jobs and their quality are obviously
justified. Once we as a society conclude that a decent job entails protection
from hazardous conditions and from discrimination and retaliation, then
164

Or, as Brishen Rogers puts it (for reasons that overlap with those offered here),
“employment-related duties should be limited to those that advance goals that can
only be achieved through changes to employer policies.” Rogers, supra note 21, at
518.
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there is no way around imposing the costs of those protections on
employers (perhaps to be shared, as market conditions permit, with
employees and consumers).
The same can be said of laws that regulate working time. One typical,
though not invariant, feature of the employment relationship is employer
control over work hours and scheduling. American legislatures have been
regulating working time for well over a century, albeit in the teeth of judicial
resistance until the New Deal breakthrough. 165 The Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) of 1938 established a forty-hour work week and a time-and-ahalf overtime premium for most employees. 166 More recently, worker
advocates have pushed for “fair scheduling” laws in response to employers’
high-tech efforts to reduce staffing costs by tailoring work schedules to
customer volume. 167 Presumably, laws that regulate onerous “just-in-time”
scheduling practices do increase the costs of employing people in some jobs
to some degree—relative, that is, to a baseline of unfettered employer
discretion—and do affect firms’ calculus as to whether to automate those
jobs. But if the entitlement to “fair scheduling” is justified (as I think it is),
then so is the regulation of employers’ scheduling practices. There is no way
to regulate hours and scheduling, and to protect workers’ ability to plan and
live their lives, without regulating employers and imposing costs on them.
For the worker entitlements that necessarily or practically entail
employer duties and burdens, the scope of employer responsibility should be
broad enough to protect the underlying rights and entitlements, to promote
compliance, and to discourage evasion through fissuring. The law should
aim to minimize the ability of lead firms to evade responsibility by
misclassifying workers as independent contractors, or to avoid the cost of
compliance by contracting out the work. In other words, for this subset of
worker rights and entitlements, efforts to extend the reach of lead firms’
responsibility make eminent good sense. Indeed, some of the entitlements
themselves ought to extend to independent contractors—for example,
freedom from discrimination and retaliation, or protection against hazards
within the control of the contracting firm.
Again, I assume that efforts to ensure “decent work” by regulating
occupational hazards, discrimination and retaliation, and working hours, and
165

See Frank T. de Vyver, Regulation of Wages and Hours Prior to 1938, 6 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 323 (1939).
166
29 U.S.C. § 203 (2012).
167
See Jonathan Timm, Why Fair Scheduling Could Be Labor’s Next Big Fight, IN
THESE TIMES (Nov. 25, 2016), http://inthesetimes.com/article/19669/why-fairscheduling-could-be-labors-next-big-fight. The technology aims to shift the cost of
as much worker down-time as possible onto workers themselves.
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by expanding both coverage and responsibility for compliance with those
laws, does generally raise the cost of human labor relative to automation. But
these entitlements are or should be part of our society’s definition of
“decent work,” and they necessarily entail corresponding duties and burdens
on employers. Debates over the establishment and enforcement of
minimum labor standards and non-waivable worker rights have always been
about what jobs we think are worth having at all at any particular point in
our economic and social development. The growing capabilities of machines
might—indeed, should—draw closer attention to that trade-off. (And if
there are more efficient and equally effective means of enforcing those
entitlements, we should explore them.) But once we settle on what “decent
work” entails and on the corresponding necessity and justifiability of
imposing certain costs on employers, we should strive to make that
judgment stick as broadly as possible, knowing and even intending that
some jobs will be lost as automation advances.
C. Employee Entitlements that Can and Should Be Detached from Employer
Mandates
That prescription does not apply, however, to all entitlements that are or
could be attached to employment. Some employer mandates redress no
harms that are either caused or preventable by the employer, and they are
not intrinsically necessary to protect the underlying entitlements.
Take health insurance, for example—a big-ticket item for many U.S.
employers. 168 Let us posit that employees need access to affordable health
care; and that most of them need help paying for it. But should the cost fall
on their employers? 169 Generally speaking, employers bear no causal
responsibility for the health care needs of workers or their families; and
there is no deterrent logic in requiring employers to bear a portion of
employees’ health insurance costs, as the pay-or-play mandate of the ACA
tends to do. On the contrary, the ACA might counterproductively deter
some employment, for employers can escape its reach by reducing
employees’ hours below 30 per week, the threshold for employee coverage,
168

According to a 2016 survey of employers, “Annual premiums for employersponsored family health coverage reached $18,142 this year, up 3 percent from last
year, with workers on average paying $5,277 towards the cost of their coverage.”
HENRY KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 2016 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY,
http://www.kff.org/health-costs/report/2016-employer-health-benefits-survey. Not all
of these costs are the product of legal mandates, of course.
169
Again, employers might pass much of the cost on to consumers or back to
employees through lower pay, down to the minimum wage level, or through reduced
employment. The latter, which is our main concern here, becomes more likely with
increased automatability of work.
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or by keeping the size of their workforce below 50, the threshold for
employer coverage. 170 But any form of employer mandate, to the extent it
imposes unavoidable costs on employers,171 will tend to discourage some
employment and encourage the substitution of machines (or contractors
who are not covered by the mandate) for employees, assuming labor and
capital are substitutable.
Some have proposed extending guaranteed health benefits to all
workers, including part-time employees and independent contractors or
“gig” workers, while maintaining the link to paid work. The best of those
proposals provides for benefits that are portable from job to job and funded
on a pro rata basis by firms on behalf of all who perform work for them.172
The result would be to extend coverage to individuals who need it, and to
reduce firms’ incentive to substitute part-timers or freelancers for full-time
employees. That is all to the good. But as long as the mandate is tied to the
use of human labor, it will still tend to tilt the users’ calculus toward the exit
option of automation when that is feasible.
The point here is simple, though the details are devilish. A broad
entitlement to health insurance makes good normative sense; but that does
not necessarily dictate putting its cost on the users of labor. To whatever
extent the funding of health benefits is uncoupled from the use of human
labor, we can mitigate firms’ incentive to replace employees with contractors
and human labor with machines. I will return below, and only briefly, to the
question of how to finance health insurance if not through an employer
mandate; but for now I simply note that alternative finance mechanisms
170

See Alexander, supra note 119, at 318. The empirical evidence on these effects
is mixed. One study estimated “an increase in low-hours, involuntary part-time
employment of a half-million to a million workers in retail, accommodations, and
food services.” Marcus Dillender, Carolyn J. Heinrick & Susan Houseman, Effects of
the Affordable Care Act on Part-Time Employment, Early Evidence (Upjohn Inst.,
Working Paper No. 16-258, 2016),
https://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1276&context
=up_workingpapers. Other studies are inconclusive or show limited effects. E.g.
Abraham et al., supra note 122.
171
That is, to the extent that the cost cannot be passed back to employees through
lower pay or on to customers through higher prices. That question is taken up below,
infra ---.
172
For a proposal along these lines—though not clearly meant to be mandatory—see
Common Ground for Independent Workers: Principles for Delivering a Stable and
Flexible Safety Net for All Types of Work, MEDIUM (Nov. 9, 2015),
https://medium.com/the-wtf-economy/common-ground-for-independent-workers83f3fbcf548f (“Everyone, regardless of employment classification, should have
access to the option of an affordable safety net that supports them when they’re
injured, sick, in need of professional growth, or when it’s time to retire.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3007972

What Should We Do After Work?

49

might have the additional virtues of enabling a modicum of redistribution,
thus mitigating economic inequality, and of increasing the policy’s efficiency.
The argument here is not that we should repeal the ACA’s employer
mandate, which is currently a necessary component of our health care
system, before replacing it with something better. The United States was
long an outlier among developed countries in relying largely on voluntary
employer provision of health benefits—with a backstop of Medicaid for the
poor and Medicare for the elderly, and with the increasingly weak spur of
collective bargaining and competition with unionized firms. The ACA made
the long-overdue shift to an employer mandate (plus a now-deceased
individual mandate to cover those still left out in the cold). 173 Indeed, a
broader mandate that covered some independent workers would be a net
improvement. 174 But given a serious prospect of net job losses from
automation, the tax that such employer mandates impose on the use of
human labor is among the reasons to take the next step from an
employment-based system toward some form of universal single-payer
health care model.175Beyond that point, the extremely complex mechanics,
economics, and politics of health care are outside the scope of this paper.
Consider another example: mandatory paid leave for childcare, eldercare,
or other family responsibilities. Employees should be able to take a
reasonable period of time off for these basic human activities without losing
either their job or their income (as they can in every other OECD
country 176). But who should bear the costs of the entitlement to family
leave? To answer that question, it is necessary to distinguish between the
173

The ACA model took a step closer to the so-called “Bismarck Model,” found in
Germany, France, and Japan, inter alia, which also relies on private insurers and
mostly private providers, with funding through mandatory employer contributions.
That model similarly taxes the employment of people, but the tax is smaller because
insurers are non-profit and tightly regulated, and costs are lower. See T.R. REID, THE
HEALING OF AMERICA: A GLOBAL QUEST FOR BETTER, CHEAPER, AND FAIRER
HEALTH CARE (2009).
174
See infra ---.
175
Single-payer plans may use a single government provider (as in the UK’s socalled “Beveridge Model”), or may use multiple and mostly private providers (as in
Canada’s National Health Insurance system. REID, supra note 173, at --. The singlepayer concept is still a political long shot in the United States, though it is seemingly
gaining support. Alexander Burns & Jennifer Medina, The Single-Payer Party?
Democrats Shift Left on Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/03/us/ democrats-universal-health-care-singlepayer-party.html?_r=0.
176
Gretchen Livingston, Among 41 Nations, U.S. Is the Outlier When it Comes to
Paid Parental Leave, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 26, 2016),
https://www.pewresearch.org/ fact-tank/2016/09/26/u-s-lacks-mandated-paidparental-leave.
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entitlement to take time off without job loss and the entitlement to be paid
during that time. It clearly makes sense to require the employer to grant
leave for these purposes and to restore the employee’s job afterward (as the
Family and Medical Leave Act does). 177 Only the employer can do that, and
the costs are relatively modest, or even outweighed on some accounts by
intangible gains from employee morale and retention. 178
But what about the larger cost of paid family leave? The employer did
not cause the circumstances giving rise to the leave, and can do nothing to
avoid it—or nothing good, anyway. If employers had to pay the cost of
family leave directly out of current revenues, some of them would inevitably
discourage and penalize leave-taking or avoid hiring likely leave-takers, such
as women of childbearing age. 179 To avoid this problem, state-level
mandatory paid leave programs in the U.S. generally use a payroll tax, which
spreads the cost of paid leave across the entire workforce. 180 But a payroll
tax modestly raises the cost of employing everyone, and thus potentially tilts
firms’ calculus toward automating work where that is feasible. 181
Once again, we should recall the economists’ assumption that payroll
taxes generally fall on employees regardless of who nominally pays them.182
On that assumption, the resulting tax is regressive—because it generally
phases out at higher income levels—but not one that should spur

177

FMLA
As calculated by
179
Of course, that would be illegal, but it might not be detectable, provable, or likely
to trigger a lawsuit. See Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the
Workplace: Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154
(1994).
180
That is the case in California and New Jersey, two states with paid family leave
programs. A Trump Administration proposal would link funding to unemployment
compensation programs, also funded by payroll taxes. Maggie Haberman, Ivanka
Trump Swayed the President on Family Leave. Congress Is a Tougher Sell, N.Y.
TIMES (May 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/21/us/politics/ivankatrump-parental-leave-plan.html.
181
Paid family leave might well pay off for employers in the form of employee
retention and loyalty. That is presumably why some employers voluntarily offer paid
family leave benefits. For those who do not, and who would be affected by a
mandate, it is possible but hardly certain that the benefits of employee retention
outweigh the costs of paid leave.
182
See Kelly Bedard & Maya Rossin-Slater, The Economic and Social Impacts of
Paid Family Leave in California: Report for the California Employment
Development Department, CAL. EMPL. DEV. DEP’T (Oct. 13, 2016),
https://www.edd.ca.gov/Disability/pdf/PFL_Economic_and_Social_Impact_Study.p
df [https://perma.cc/MU6V-D3AP].
178
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automation. 183 But the assumption may not comport with the beliefs of
employers who make decisions about automation, and in any event it runs
out at the low end of the labor market. To whatever extent the burden of
mandatory paid family leave does fall on employers, it is part of a cumulative
tax on employment whose incentive effects might be counterproductive in
an age of accelerating automation. 184
To be sure, much turns on the particulars of the program. Existing paid
family leave mandates in California, New Jersey, and Rhode Island, for
example, are modest, providing for partial salary replacement for four to six
weeks. 185 At those levels, the cost appears to be quite small, wherever it
falls. 186 Suppose, however, that we aspired to a more generous paid family
leave mandate (like those in much of Europe.) 187 And suppose that we
sought to extend the entitlement to paid leave to cover a larger set of family
and medical exigencies, and even to allow an annual paid vacation of at least
three or four weeks, along with some number of paid holidays.
If we did all those things, we would join the overwhelming majority of
the world’s developed countries in the worthy effort to enable employees to
care for themselves and their families and have an annual respite from work,
without losing their income for those periods. 188 Yet this larger entitlement
to paid leave—if it were funded through a payroll tax or other mandatory
183

Payroll taxes in general are the most regressive large category of taxes (in Europe
as well as in the U.S.). See Briefing Book, TAX POL’Y CTR. (2016),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/are-federal-taxes-progressive
[https://perma.cc/66M8-UC2K].
184
See, e.g., Harry J. Holzer, Paid Family Leave: Balancing Benefits and Costs,
BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-mobilitymemos/2017/01/30/paid-family-leave-balancing-benefits-and-costs
[https://perma.cc/A33C-ENQ4].
185
Id.
186
Id.; Eileen Appelbaum & Ruth Milkman, Paid Family Leave Pays Off in
California, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 19, 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/01/paid-familyleave-pays-off-in [https://perma.cc/KNU3-T945]; The Economics of Paid and
Unpaid Leave, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS (JUNE 2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/leave_report_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9RVB-GRWP].
187
See Erin Killian, Parental Leave: The Swedes Are the Most Generous, NPR (Aug.
8, 2011 3:59 PM EST),
https://www.npr.org/sections/babyproject/2011/08/09/139121410/parental-leave-theswedes-are-the-most-generous [https://perma.cc/8J87-LRRD].
188
The United States is the only OECD country that has no mandatory paid vacation
or personal leave, and among the few without a right to paid holidays. See Rebecca
Ray & John Schmitt, No-Vacation Nation USA – A Comparison of Leave and
Holiday in OECD Countries, European Economic and Employment Policy Brief No.
3 (ISSN 1782‐2165), ETUI-REHC (2007).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3007972

52

What Should We Do After Work?

employer contribution keyed to number of employees and hours of work—
would put a significant tax on employment. 189 While normatively justifiable,
such a tax would be counterproductive. Rather than setting up productive
incentives to avoid socially harmful conduct, the mandate would give firms
an added incentive to offload employees and avoid those costs through
fissuring or automation.
An alternative would be to shift all or part of the cost of these social
benefits onto a different and more progressive tax base. The goal would be
to reduce the tax on the use of human labor. This would permit a measure
of redistribution from those whose wealth and income flow from capital and
technological innovation toward workers. I will return below, albeit briefly,
to the question of how that might best be accomplished. The point here is
that some entitlements that have historically been linked to employment
should be reconceived, and their funding mechanisms reconfigured, so that
they do not tax and discourage the employment of human labor. Some
employer mandates usefully force employers to bear the costs of, and to
avoid, socially harmful conduct within their operations. But others are
politically expedient off-budget ways to finance social entitlements that bear
no necessary relation to employment or to work.
For historically contingent reasons, both public policy and private
ordering have held major employers in the United States—more than their
counterparts in Europe—heavily responsible for their employees’ ability to
care for their dependents and to live a decent life through retirement.190
There is nothing wrong with that approach in principle. And it might have
been sustainable in the economy of the past century, dominated as it was by
vertically integrated firms with strong internal labor markets and long-term
employment relationships within mostly national labor and product
markets. 191 But in an age of shorter job tenure, proliferating contingent work
arrangements, rampant fissuring, and global production networks, we need
to rethink that paradigm, as Katherine Stone and others have argued for
several years. 192 Rapidly advancing automation capabilities amplify the point.
We need better ways of delivering basic social entitlements and meeting
189

This larger entitlement would be subject to all the same qualifiers as noted above,
including the greater impact on low-wage jobs.
190
Stone, others. Collective bargaining between unions and major employers, wartime wage controls in the 1940s, and tax laws all played pivotal roles in the “Treaty
of Detroit” that created this template. See Shayna Strom & Mark Schmitt, Protecting
Workers in a Patchwork Economy, CENTURY FOUND. 2 (Apr. 7, 2016). For more on
the Treaty of Detroit, see NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, WALTER REUTHER: THE MOST
DANGEROUS MAN IN DETROIT (1995).
191
Stone, A Fatal Mismatch, supra note 87, at 460.
192
Id. at 464.
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people’s material needs that are not dependent on steady full-time
employment, and that do not function as a tax on the use of human labor
versus machines.
It is not just the cost of entitlements but the entitlements themselves
that in some cases should extend beyond employment. 193 After all, not only
employees but also self-employed individuals need to be able to take time
off from work without losing their entire income for the duration. 194 That
might be ensured through a system of “social drawing rights” to support
time off from paid work—whether in employment or self-employment—for
education, retraining, a job search, or volunteer civic work. 195 Proposals to
subsidize time out of the paid workforce for such socially valuable purposes
(like other proposals for mandatory paid leave) will become even more
compelling if we do begin to see significant net job losses and further
declines in labor force participation. If such subsidies were funded through a
broad-based and progressive tax, this would also be a way of redistributing
income from the winners to the not-winners in a more polarized economy,
as well as meeting the various human needs that require time away from
work and distributing both work and leisure in a more equitable way. It
would do all those things without taxing, and thus discouraging, the use of
human labor.
The basic strategy of separating the question of what workers should be
entitled to from the question of how to pay for those entitlements has
complicated and surprising implications for minimum wage laws. Suppose
we agree, as to the first question, that all workers deserve at least a “living
wage”—enough for a single individual working full-time to meet basic
material needs without public assistance. 196 That obviously depends on the
local cost of living. But $7.25 per hour falls far short of a living wage, not
only in high-cost states and cities (many of which have raised the local
minimum wage rate), but even in the poorest counties in the nation.197 In
193

See Nicolas Colin & Bruno Palier, The Next Safety Net: Social Policy for a
Digital Age, FOREIGN AFF. (July/Aug. 2015),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-06-16/next-safety-net
[https://perma.cc/3DWT-62JA].
194
See Julie Kashen, The Future of Work? Paid Leave for All, CENTURY FOUND.
(Mar. 8, 2018), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/future-work-paid-leave/
[https://perma.cc/6N83-J6P9] (referring to New York’s recent paid family leave law
that permits independent contractors and self-employed individuals to opt-in).
195
See SUPIOT, supra note --, at 56.
196
It is more debatable whether the minimum wage should enable workers to support
one or more dependents—which they may or may not have.
197
One of the poorest counties in the U.S. is Holmes County, Mississippi, where the
living wage is calculated to be $10.25 per hour. See Living Wage Calculation for
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short, pegging the minimum wage to the “living wage” would require large
locally-targeted increases—as much as 75 percent in some cases. 198 By
comparison, a national minimum wage of $15 per hour would more than
double the current minimum wage, and would far exceed a “living wage,” in
much of the country.199
The problem is that, as economists across the political spectrum agree,
those very large wage hikes would almost certainly destroy jobs and displace
workers. 200 The wage-destructive tendencies of large minimum wage
increases are magnified as robots become ever-better and cheaper
substitutes for human workers, especially in the routine tasks entailed by
many low-wage jobs. Workers do need a raise, but they also need jobs (at
least under current social arrangements). So even if we agree that lowincome workers need and deserve higher incomes, we should ask whether it
makes sense as a pragmatic matter to require employers to supply those
higher incomes in the form of a significantly higher minimum wage. Or are
there other ways to put part of that money into workers’ pockets?
Indeed there are. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) currently
subsidizes low income earners, and funds that subsidy through general
revenues in the form of a “tax expenditure.” Daniel Shaviro, among others,
has argued that the EITC is a better way to raise poor workers’ incomes and
to increase the returns to work than higher minimum wages, both because
the subsidy is better targeted at low-income workers and because it does not
tax and reduce employment. 201 Better yet, he argued, would be a “universal
lump sum payment”—essentially a guaranteed basic income—or “negative

Holmes County, Mississippi, LIVING WAGE CALCULATOR (2018),
https://livingwage.mit.edu/counties/28051 [https://perma.cc/M3EV-VTQU].
198
This would apply to Atlanta, Georgia, for example. See Living Wage Calculation
for Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA, LIVING WAGE CALCULATOR (2018),
https://livingwage.mit.edu/metros/12060 [https://perma.cc/KJ7F-Y2BD].
199
That is, it would double the minimum wage in all states and cities where the
national minimum wage currently prevails. A minimum wage of $15 is higher than
the “living wage” for a single individual almost everywhere, though not, for
example, in Manhattan (New York County, NY). See Living Wage Calculation for
New York County, NY, LIVING WAGE CALCULATOR (2018),
https://livingwage.mit.edu/counties/36061 [https://perma.cc/GUH7-2X5M].
200
201

Shaviro, supra note 144. Notably, the EITC covers “self-employed” workers who
work as independent contractors. 26 U.S.C. § 32(c)(2)(A)(ii) (2012). The EITC does
not now, but could, reflect local differences in the cost of living. David Callahan,
Why Not Peg EITC Benefits to the Local Cost of Living?, DEMOS (Mar. 9, 2014),
https://www.demos.org/blog/3/19/14/why-not-peg-eitc-benefits-local-cost-living
[https://perma.cc/manage/create?folder=4028].
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marginal tax rates” at low income levels. 202 Others have argued for “wage
subsidies” that low-wage workers receive with each paycheck instead of at
the end of the tax year, and without the filing requirements that keep many
eligible workers from claiming the EITC.203 In one way or another, all of
these alternative strategies effectively separate the question of what workers
need or deserve by way of income from the question of what their
employers should be required to pay them. In addition, most of them allow
for, and are not incompatible with, the pursuit of legitimate redistributive
aims without a counterproductive impact on employment.
This argument flies in the face of what might seem a perfectly sensible
premise, and a blanket rejoinder to the whole concept of unburdening
employment. Employers deserve to pay whatever workers rightly deserve to
earn as a return on their labor. As the Supreme Court pointed out over 80
years ago when it finally upheld legislatures’ power to set minimum wages,
[T]he denial of a living wage . . . casts a direct burden for [workers’]
support upon the community. What these workers lose in wages the
taxpayers are called upon to pay. The bare cost of living must be met. . .
. The community is not bound to provide what is in effect a subsidy for
unconscionable employers. 204
I find that claim normatively appealing, and certainly sufficient to uphold the
constitutionality of minimum wages. Moreover, in an era of rapid
industrialization, mandating higher wages helped to push firms toward more
efficient (and automated) modes of production and the better jobs they
created. Many would make the same claim today: If higher labor standards
accelerate the destruction of low-paid jobs, so much the better, for as in the
past we can expect those jobs to be replaced by better jobs.
I have offered my response above. It is at least plausible to think that
this time is different, and that we face significant net job losses that will
require major social and political adjustments that we can more plausibly
make with a slower pace of automation. In short, to the extent that firms are
increasingly able to boost profits by shedding workers and automating work,
their chronic complaints about costs the labor and employment law impose
202

Shaviro, supra note 144, at 410.
For an empirical assessment of some relatively narrow wage subsidy programs,
see Lawrence F. Katz, Wage Subsidies for the Disadvantaged, (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5679, 1996). For a more polemical
endorsement from a business-friendly think tank, see The Case for a Targeted Living
Wage Subsidy, EMP. POLICIES INST. (2001), https://www.epionline.org/wpcontent/studies/epi_livingwage_07-2001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/manage/create?folder=4028].
204
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937).
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on employment will have to be taken more seriously. But that need not
entail cutting back on workers’ entitlements; in some cases we can and
should instead shift the burden of paying for those entitlements away from
the employment nexus.
D. Paying for Entitlements that Are Detached from Employment
Thus far I have argued for expanding some entitlements and their costs,
and for abandoning the current mechanism for financing them. But that
raises the obvious question, already touched on, of how to pay for those
entitlements. Without wandering too far into the sphere of tax policy and
public finance, let us take up that question briefly.
The aim is to shift costs away from those who hire workers toward
those who are leading, and profiting extravagantly from, the substitution of
technology for human labor. Automation has already contributed to the
troubling growth of economic inequality by increasing the returns to capital
versus labor, and is likely to continue to do so going forward. 205 It is
increasingly both a moral and a political imperative to find ways to
redistribute income from the winners in our highly polarized economy to
those who have lost ground or are just scraping by. (On the political
question of how to persuade more voters of the need for redistribution I will
be even more brief here.)
Redistribution can be achieved, and inequality countered, through policy
decisions on both the taxing side and the spending side of the public
ledger. 206 In the more egalitarian European countries, redistribution is
accomplished less through a highly progressive tax structure than through
larger public expenditures on behalf of those in need (and higher taxes
overall). On the spending side, I have already argued for replacing employee
entitlements with broader or universal benefits such as affordable health
care, reasonably generous paid family and medical leave and vacations,
decent retirement income, and income support for poor workers. But the
net redistributive impact of these programs, and the impact on economic
inequality, would depend on how they are financed—on the taxation side of
the ledger.
It is worth noting at the outset that the payroll tax, which now finances
several major employee entitlements, is perhaps the single most regressive
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This problem is exacerbated by the U.S. tax code, which “subsidizes capital
relative to labor.” See Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 39, at 14; see also Abbott &
Bogenschneider, supra note 98, at 150.
206
Edward D. Kleinbard, We Are Better Than This: How Government Should Spend
Our Money, at xxi (2015).
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major source of tax revenues in the United States (and elsewhere). 207 So
shifting all or part of the cost of some worker entitlements from employers’
payrolls to a broader and more progressive tax base would (modestly)
mitigate both the incentive to automate and the growth of income inequality.
Given the multiple goals here—funding social benefits, achieving
redistribution, and mitigating the incentive to automate—it seems hard to
resist the idea of a “robot tax,” proposed famously by Bill Gates and Elon
Musk. 208 On the face of it, such a tax could simultaneously slow down the
replacement of people by robots, replace lost payroll tax revenues as payrolls
shrink, and promote equitable redistribution from those who make and own
the robots to those whose jobs they are destroying or degrading. In terms of
the impact on firms’ decisions about deployment of human labor versus
robots, a robot tax might look like a mirror image of my proposal to reduce
the law’s tax on human labor (but without the attack on cherished and hardfought labor gains). Presumably, like the tax on human labor, a robot tax
would affect firms’ decisions only at the margin; size matters. But the basic
concept might seem irresistible given all I have argued here.
Most economists scoff at the idea of a “robot tax,” however. There is
the daunting challenge of identifying a “robot”—they do not all look like C3PO or R2-D2 in Star Wars 209—and the many non-robotic forms of
automation that a robot tax would miss. More importantly, however, they
say that it would drive efficiency- and productivity-enhancing capital
investments from the taxing nation elsewhere, perhaps resulting in an
increase in offshoring of jobs (unless it were implemented globally). 210
Whether that argument reflects assumptions about the overall net societal
benefits of automation, and whether it bears weight once we relax those
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That is based on the standard assumption that the payroll tax falls largely on
workers themselves, and on the fact that the tax drops out at high income levels. (As
of 2018, only the first $125,400 of income is subject to the tax. Maximum Taxable
Earnings (1937-2018), SOC. SECURITY ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/planners/maxtax.html,
[https://perma.cc/manage/create?folder=4028].) If we relax the first assumption, the
payroll tax would be less regressive but more likely to discourage employment.
208
See The Robot that Takes Your Job Should Pay Taxes, Says Bill Gates, QUARTZ
(Feb. 17, 2017), https://qz.com/911968/bill-gates-the-robot-that-takes-your-jobshould-pay-taxes [https://perma.cc/manage/create?folder=4028]; see also Abbott &
Bogenschneider, supra note 98.
209
For that reason, others have proposed proxies for a “robot tax,” such as a tax
based on the ratio of profits to number of employees. That would avoid the problem
of identifying robots, but it would exacerbate the problem of discouraging or driving
away productivity-enhancing investments.
210
----
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assumptions, are questions I will not attempt to untangle here. 211 So let me
bracket the concept of a “robot tax” to consider some alternatives.
Perhaps the simplest way in the United States to achieve some
redistribution of income and to pay for what are now employee entitlements
is to increase the income tax and steepen its progressivity. 212 We have
already noted the virtues of a negative income tax over minimum wages as a
way to increase incomes of poor workers; we could couple such a tax with
significantly higher marginal tax rates for the richest individuals. One need
not delve into the numbers to recognize that there is some income tax rate
structure that could fully fund a set of universal social entitlements that
would more than replace the existing system of mandatory employee
benefits (as well as large increases in the minimum wage).
There are alternatives, of course, such as a wealth tax (a global version
of which was proposed by Thomas Picketty as an antidote to rising
inequality), 213 or a European-style consumption tax (whose tendency toward
regressivity could be offset either by other taxes or, on the spending side, by
using increased revenues to fund redistributive programs), or some
combination of taxes on income, wealth, financial transactions, and
consumption. Each of these forms of taxation has its advantages and
disadvantages, though this is not the place to explore those issues.
E. The Broader Case for Reconstructing the Platform for Social Rights and Benefits
This Article’s argument in some ways recalls prior efforts to deal with
the disintegration of the standard employment relationship and the rise of
various forms of contingent work and “self-employment.” 214 Those
challenges, too, prompted a reconsideration of the continued viability of the
contract of employment as what Brian Langille called “the ‘platform’ for
delivering rights and benefits” as well as for imposing obligations. 215 It
211

I will note that countering the employment law tax on human labor with a tax on
robots would seem to be a convoluted means of rebalancing the playing field, if that
is what we are trying to do. But a robot tax might have other virtues.
212
Greater progressivity could be achieved in part by eliminating some highly
regressive tax expenditures including “around $100 billion of outright subsidies
every year to various business interests—subsidies that never would pass muster as
cash outlays.” KLEINBARD, supra note 206, at 242.
213
See PIKETTY, supra note 26, at --.
214
See, e.g., ALAIN SUPIOT, BEYOND EMPLOYMENT: CHANGES IN WORK AND THE
FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE 56 (2001). This work was originally published
as the 1999 “Supiot Report” to the European Commission, originally titled Beyond
Employment, and was a landmark in that body of scholarship.
215
Fudge, Tucker & Vosko, supra note 152, at 331-32 (quoting Brian Langille,
Labour Policy in Canada—New Platform, New Paradigm, 28 CANADIAN PUB. POL’Y
133 (2002)).
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remains an important and unfinished project to consider which employee
rights and benefits should be extended to others who perform work outside
the employment contract. My point here, however, is that expanding “the
‘platform’ for delivering rights and benefits” to include self-employed
workers, and expanding the responsibilities of firms accordingly, may not go
far enough in an era of accelerating automation and decreasing reliance on
human labor.
For much of the twentieth century, many of the entitlements of
employees, workers, and citizens were bundled together in a concept that an
eminent Canadian labor law scholar, Harry Arthurs, called “industrial
citizenship.” Industrial citizenship is “an employment-related system of
entitlements which would protect workers against arbitrary treatment by
their employer and the vicissitudes of the economy, old age and illness.”216
Much as the erosion of the standard employment relationship through
fissuring highlighted the need to extend those entitlements beyond
employment, so too the growing capabilities and falling costs of automation
now highlight the need to extend some of those entitlements, their funding,
or both beyond the broader platform of paid work. In both cases, the goal is
at least two-pronged: first, to extend crucial entitlements to those who in the
past would have been, but no longer are, securely ensconced within stable
employment relationships; and second, to preserve jobs—that is, to counter
firms’ incentive to replace employees with contractors or human workers
with machines.
This Article has focused mainly on the latter virtue of untying some
entitlements and their costs from employment. I do not want to overstate
the impact on job conservation. Having argued for a fairly cautious
recalibration of the legal burdens on employment of human labor—one that
aims to preserve or even expand the contours of the decent work agenda—I
cannot claim more than an incremental reduction in firms’ incentive to
offload workers. On the other hand, the strategy proposed here, unlike the
fortress strategy, would help to meet both the challenge of automation and
the challenge of fissuring. It would reduce firms’ incentive to replace
employees with either contractors or machines.
The strategy I have proposed also has the virtue of extending crucial
entitlements to those who no longer work within stable employment
relationships. Doing so would promote both liberty and equality. First, the
216

H. W. Arthurs, The New Economy and the New Legality: Industrial Citizenship
and the Future of Labour Arbitration, 7 CANADIAN LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45, 46 (1999);
see also H. W. Arthurs, Developing Industrial Citizenship: A Challenge for
Canada’s Second Century, 45 REV. B. CANADIEN 786 (1967).
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strategy proposed here would better enable some individuals to choose the
greater autonomy and flexibility of self-employment or freelancing (even as
it reduced firms’ incentive to use freelancers instead of employees). It is hard
to credit the rosy depictions of the so-called “sharing economy” when so
many of those who work in that economy would prefer to have a real job
and the relative stability and benefits that go with it. 217 Yet freelance and
platform-based work is not merely a sham or a last resort for those who
cannot get a full-time job. Many individuals genuinely value the freedom
from direct supervision and the ability to determine their own work
schedule. 218 Others would surely make that choice if they had a baseline
level of economic security from which to do so.
I emphasize that we should not dismantle the current system of
employment-based benefits, creaky and incomplete though it is, unless and
until a sustainable system of more broadly socialized benefits is at hand.
Efforts broadly to socialize and subsidize what have long been employee
benefits will face stiff political headwinds, including powerful anti-tax and
anti-redistributive impulses (even among some prospective beneficiaries),219
as well as evasive maneuvers, such as transnational tax strategies by which
firms or individuals can reduce their tax exposure by offshoring operations
or income. The project outlined here aims to replace the existing
employment-based social model, but not, in the meantime, to undermine it.
A stronger universal system of social provision would also promote
equality in two senses. It would redistribute some of the outsized gains at
the top of the income distribution to those whose living standards have
stagnated. And it would counter the stratification of society into insiders—
relatively privileged and well-provisioned employees of leading firms—and
outsiders who are left to their own devices (or to a social safety net that is
politically vulnerable because of its narrow focus on the poor).
The prevailing strategy of doubling down on and shoring up the fortress
of employment, however successful, will still leave out a large and almost
certainly growing segment of the adult population, along with their
dependents. Detached from economically capable and relatively compliant
lead firms, they may work for less profitable and compliant contractor firms,
217

MGI, Study on Independent Work, supra note 104, at 1.
Id.
219
On the politics of redistribution, see Gillian Lester, Can Joe the Plumber Support
Redistribution? Law, Social Preferences, and Sustainable Policy Design, 64 TAX L.
REV. 313 (2011); Gillian Lester, “Keep Government Out of My Medicare”: The
Elusive Search for Popular Support of Taxes and Social Spending, in WORKING AND
LIVING IN THE SHADOW OF ECONOMIC FRAGILITY (Michael Sherraden and Marion
Crain eds., 2013).
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or as independent contractors, freelancers, temps. Or they may be unable to
find steady paid work at all. A stronger set of basic social entitlements would
help to ensure that those individuals and their children will enjoy the
foundations of a decent and healthy life even if they cannot enter the
fortress of full-time stable employment.
F. Some Objections, Alternatives, and Extensions
I have argued that a shift away from employment as the platform for
entitlements and their funding, and toward more universal social
entitlements and broader-based funding, would serve multiple goals. But the
strategy of “unburdening” employment—even along the circumspect lines
proposed here—will meet resistance from those who seek instead to fortify
the existing model of worker rights and entitlements and employer
responsibilities—to shore up the fortress of employment.
As suggested above, some of the resistance to unburdening employment
reflects a premise, explicit or implicit, that employers deserve to bear the
burden of whatever rights and entitlements workers deserve to have,
including the minimum material requisites of a decent life for oneself and
one’s dependents. 220 I share that intuition, but I have come to question it. As
it becomes easier for employers lawfully to escape those burdens—partially
through fissuring or altogether through automation—the premise begins to
look self-defeating. It is certainly in tension with plausible concerns about
the pace of automation and the prospects of net job destruction.
Other objections to the unburdening strategy are more pragmatic. One,
also foreshadowed above, harkens back to the economists’ mantra of
creative destruction: even if high labor standards are likely to destroy some
jobs, they will also help to generate new and better jobs. As Marc Linder has
shown, that was the view of some New Deal proponents of early minimum
wage laws. The tendency both to displace some workers and to promote
more capital-intensive modes of production was viewed as a feature, not a
bug, of those laws.221 As a result, both consumer demand and displaced
workers would flow toward the more efficient (and capital intensive)
producers who could afford to pay higher wages. 222 But if this time really is
different in terms of prospective net job losses—as new technologies close
220

It might resonate, too, with a fulsome conception of the total cost of reproducing
labor, the burden of which should arguably fall on those who use labor.
221
Marc Linder, The Minimum Wage as Industrial Policy: A Forgotten Role, 16 J.
LEGIS. 151 (1990).
222
This was not just left to the “invisible hand” of the market; public investments in
training, transition, assistance, and job creation were also part of the New Deal
program, and of the recovery. See infra note --.
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in on most of the human capabilities that both present and future product
and service markets require—we have more to worry about than the New
Dealers did. 223
Another argument for shoring up the fortress of employment, and
against the “unburdening” strategy, is more fatalistic. Net job losses due to
automation are inevitable, and will not be much affected by reducing the
costs of employees’ legal rights, benefits, and protections. Those costs
obviously matter only at the margin in firms’ decisions about automation;
and cutting them back would only marginally slow down the loss of jobs
while undermining the quality and working conditions in the jobs that
remain. To be sure, people will not win a “race against the machines” on
cost grounds, and they should not try to do so. Still, we should not imagine
that the pace of automation does not matter. The faster jobs are automated,
the less time people will have to acquire the skills needed in a more techinfused economy; and the less time we as a society will have to devise, build
support for, and implement sensible legal and institutional responses to
automation.
Underlying the last two defenses of the legal fortress of employment are
conflicting predictions about the future impact of automation on jobs—one
that is skeptical of the prospect of job losses and one that is resigned to
them. That reminds us again of the uncertainties and contingencies that
cloud our labor market forecast, which might be yet another reason to resist
a broadly deregulatory response to fears of automation-induced job loss. Yet
all of these arguments together do not wholly dispel the concern that labor
and employment laws are contributing in some measure to the speed and
extent of job losses. I have argued that it is possible to counter that impact
while protecting workers’ rights and interests, and at the same time to begin
to construct a stronger and more inclusive foundation for the more varied
working lives that are likely in the labor markets of the future.
Others might criticize the unburdening strategy proposed here, and
defend existing employment rights and benefits, by touting the purported
superiority of alternative policy tools for spreading the benefits and
mitigating the costs of automation. Among the most salient alternatives are
new or expanded forms of income support—such as a UBI or a negative
income tax—and public investments in job creation and job preparation.
223

For those who yearn for a post-work future, we might instead have more to gain
from higher labor standards—precisely because of the tendency to accelerate
automation. See, e.g., NICK SRINECK AND ALEX WILLIAMS, INVENTING THE FUTURE:
POSTCAPITALISM AND A WORLD WITHOUT WORK (2015) (arguing for higher labor
standards in order to accelerate the shift from paid work to a universal basic income
as the foundation for individuals’ material wellbeing).
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Richard Freeman proposes an interesting variant by which workers would
acquire an equity share in technological capital, and derive part of their
income from that equity. 224 Given the growing disparity in returns to capital
(including robots) versus labor, he contends that workers need a larger stake
in the latter as one source of income.
This is not the place to thoroughly evaluate all of these alternative
policies. I will note that some of them blend into, and others are entirely
compatible with, the proposals I have made here. And I do not believe they
undermine this Article’s basic case for shifting some of the entitlements and
burdens that are currently linked to employment to a broader set of
beneficiaries and a broader funding base. For example, a UBI or its
equivalent would help people weather—or even choose—breaks or
shortfalls in paid employment, or choose independent work beyond
employment. It would also redistribute some of the gains from automation
from the economic winners to the losers. It is striking that Andy Stern, a
former trade-union leader, emerged from a deep dive into the study of the
impact of technology on the future of work as a proselytizer for a UBI. He
concluded it was a necessary response to a foreseeable future of massive job
destruction through automation. 225 The case for a UBI is currently hotly
contested and faces daunting political odds. But the case will undoubtedly
grow stronger and gain adherents if job losses begin to mount. A UBI is not
incompatible with the strategy proposed here, but unless these new income
entitlements also replace or reduce the burden of some employer mandates,
they would not have the job preservation benefits of the strategy I have
proposed. Any moves toward supplementing wage-based income should be
designed to slow as well as to cushion job losses.
Another alternative response to the challenge of automation is
investments in job creation and job preparation. Public investments in
physical infrastructure and in social services for people—especially young,
old, and disabled people—who cannot afford to buy the care they need in
the market would both create jobs and meet societal needs. 226 A program of
224

Richard Freeman has proposed that, in view of the seemingly abiding shift in the
distribution of income away from labor and toward capital (and robots), this income
support might be derived from workers’ ownership of sizable chunks of
technological capital. Freeman, supra note 7, at 1.
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See STERN & KRAVITZ, supra note 3.
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On the economic and social value of public investments in caregiving and early
childhood education, see Nina Dastur et al., Building the Sharing Economy:
Workforce Investments to Expand Access to Affordable, High-Quality Early and
Long-Term Care, GEO. CTR. ON POVERTY AND INEQ., (2017),
https://www.georgetownpoverty.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Building-thecaring-economy_hi-res.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZTM-UZZZ].
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national service—voluntary or even mandatory—would do both of those
things and perhaps more. 227 Better institutions of basic and higher education
and vocational training and retraining, for their part, would help equip
people for the technology-adjacent jobs that are likely to grow in the future.
These institutions would also allow more people to benefit from the gains
that automation will produce. 228
Again, the question is not the value or even the necessity of these
reforms but their sufficiency. Investments in jobs and training make eminent
good sense, but alongside rather than instead of the strategy of shifting some
employment benefits from the “platform” of employment and onto a
broader tax base and to a more universal coverage formula. Public job
creation and job training will not address the growing coverage gap that
arises from fissuring and the proliferation of independent work outside the
employment nexus, nor will they serve the liberty and equality interests that
a more universal system of social benefits would advance. Pursuit of those
policies should supplement, not substitute, a recalibration of employment
mandates, benefits, and liabilities.
One final alternative strategy warrants discussion: a forced reduction in
working hours. Matthew Dimick argues that tighter regulation of working
hours would more equitably spread both work and leisure. 229 He frames his
proposal as an alternative to the UBI, but it might also be seen as an
alternative response to automation-related job losses. The proposal has real
virtues, though they do not include work preservation—tighter regulation of
hours (in the form of either an hours cap or an overtime premium) would
likely raise the hourly cost of labor and strengthen the case for automation.
227

Apart from supplying valuable paid work opportunities and work experience, “a
vastly expanded, even mandatory, national service program . . . might at once throw
Americans of every creed and culture together for a year or two at an impressionable
age, fire up civic engagement and even revive the American dream.” See Roger
Cohen, Travel Abroad, in Your Own Country, N.Y. TIMES (March 4, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/opinion/sunday/travel-abroad-in-your-owncountry.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/G5Y2-VDPJ].
228
Notably, the MGI report, Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained, supra note 60, urges measures
like these. So, too, the New Dealers who embraced the tendency of higher labor
standards to destroy some jobs, see infra ---, also urged the adoption of an “active
manpower policy,” including investments in “retraining and education . . . and public
employment,” so that displaced workers did not bear the burden of these shifts.
Linder, supra note 221, at 158-59. Indeed, the expansion of social programs and
regulatory activity since the New Deal—and the resulting growth of public
employment at all levels of government—might have offset some of the labor market
slack created by automation over the past eight decades, whether or not it was
intended to do so.
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See Dimick, supra note 9.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3007972

What Should We Do After Work?

65

(The impact on labor costs would be even greater, of course, if shorter
hours were to be achieved without lowering incomes, as past movements for
shorter working hours sought to do.) That should by no means end the
discussion. A shorter workweek (as well as universal rights to paid leave and
vacation) would be a highly desirable response to an overall decline in the
amount of paid work in the economy; it might well become part of our
evolving conception of “decent work.” But as with other aspects of “decent
work,” we should still ask whether it is possible to vindicate that entitlement
while shifting part or all of its costs away from both workers and those who
deploy their labor and onto a broader funding base.
Conclusion
The claim that machines will make human labor obsolete is both
overstated and often stated. It is a refrain that has surfaced periodically—
often with the addendum that “this time is different”—only to be buried by
the next wave of economic growth. History is largely on the side of those
enthusiasts of innovation and markets who reject or ridicule predictions of a
jobless future. And yet sometimes the future actually is different from the
past. For example, consider Malthus, who at the close of the eighteenth
century extrapolated from a long history of stagnant productivity to predict
that a growing population would inevitably outstrip society’s nearly fixed
food supply. 230 He was proven spectacularly wrong by the Industrial
Revolution. 231
We might now face a future of shrinking employment opportunities and
falling wages for workers whose skills are rapidly being replicated or
surpassed by ever-smarter and more cost-effective machines. Given current
social and economic arrangements, that is a devastating prospect for the vast
majority of people in our society who depend on paid work for their
livelihood and the material support of their dependents. And it is a
profoundly unsettling prospect for a society in which so many dimensions of
personal identity, social integration, and civil society—as well as economic
security—are intertwined with paid work. For now and for the near future,
decent work for those who want and need it—whether it is within or
beyond the employment relationship—remains a worthy aspiration. 232
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For some readers, the threat of automation to the future of work calls
for much more drastic responsive measures. Recalibrating employment
mandates and benefits, even if supplemented by policies of income support,
training, and job creation, may appear timid and insufficient to meet the
coming crisis. Why not affirmatively subsidize human labor and job
creation? Or why not tax job-destroying technology, or regulate and restrict
its deployment? Or—if the technological destruction of middle-class jobs is
precipitating the end of capitalism as we know it, as some scholars
contend 233—why not begin to grapple with the infinitely larger challenge of
building the foundations for a new political economy that is not centered on
private profits and paid work? Some of these questions will loom larger if
the facts on the ground begin to point decisively toward growing
automation-based unemployment. In particular, the notion of subsidizing
human work, and affirmatively supporting firms’ creation and maintenance
of decent jobs, bears closer scrutiny than I have given it here. But we need
to start somewhere, even in a context of uncertainty and intense debate
about the future impact of automation on labor markets. The strategy that I
have proposed can preserve decent jobs, or slow their loss, while
simultaneously laying the foundations for a future beyond employment.
There is a certain irony in the almost romantic attachment of some
contemporary worker advocates to the standard employment relationship,
with its signature features of worker dependency and managerial
domination. In the early decades of industrialization, skilled artisans fought
desperately to retain their autonomy, resisting the subordination and
dependency that came with what they called “wage slavery.” 234 Eventually
most workers and their organizations resigned themselves to the subordinate
role of employee, and fought for its reformation through an array of
employee rights, minimum labor standards, and structures for collective
representation—all to the end of transforming “wage slavery” into a decent
way of economic life for ordinary workers. But we should not assume that
the standard employment relationship, thus civilized, is a permanent reality
for most workers, much less an ideal to defend at all costs.
Through fissuring and automation, firms are increasingly finding ways to
escape their end of the socially constructed deal embodied in the standard
233
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employment relationship. And a growing number of workers are either
fleeing or being ejected from both the constraints and the protections of
that relationship. Shoring up and expanding the fortress of employment will
not prevent that exodus. We do need to improve and enforce employee
rights and labor standards—those that are necessarily tied to employment and
employer practices. We need to invest public resources in creating new jobs
and better preparing people for the jobs of the future. But we also need to
furnish the growing domain that lies beyond employment with the minimum
basic necessities of a decent life both for those who choose a more
independent economic existence and for those who cannot get into the
fortress.
In his prescient 1999 report to the European Commission, Alain Supiot
observed that “the employee subject to full-time, open-ended subordination
is surely not the only model for working life. Another figure can be
discerned on the horizon: a worker who can reconcile security and
freedom.” 235 Perhaps the real, if sometimes exaggerated, threat of
automation-based job losses will supply the motivation we need to move
toward a new social model—one that “reconcile[s] security and freedom,”
that supports many modes of working life, and that works better for all of
those who work for a living.
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